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GUARDIANSHIP FOR PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS — 
A LEGAL AND APPROPRIATE ALTERNATIVE? 
LESLIE SALZMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, when the state determines that an individual lacks 
the “capacity” to make some or all decisions, the state removes the 
individual’s legal right to make those decisions and appoints a guardian to 
make those decisions for that individual. Guardianship implicates the 
difficult question of when—and if—it is appropriate for the State to remove 
an individual’s legal right to make decisions “for his or her own good.”  It 
pits the individual’s rights of autonomy, self-determination, and self-
definition against the state’s interest in protecting individuals from personal 
and financial harm when they are found to have a diminished capability to 
make decisions and manage their own affairs.  The guardian may prevent 
an individual with diminished decision-making abilities from making 
decisions that are perceived to be unwise or contrary to the individual’s 
short- or long-term interests.  Yet, the divestiture of decision-making rights 
resulting from a guardianship order comes at a significant, though 
unquantifiable, cost to the individual who is losing his or her rights. 
This article1 discusses why guardianship and the guardianship 
appointment process may be particularly ill-suited for individuals with 
psychosocial disabilities.2  It then argues that the Americans with Disabilities 
 
* Clinical Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
 1. This article was written for a presentation at the 2011 annual meeting of the 
Association of American Law Schools panel, “New Perspectives on Guardianship:  
Guardianship and Mental Illness.”  It draws on material in a longer recent piece that has a 
more elaborate articulation of the basis for an ADA integration mandate claim in the 
guardianship context.  See Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again):  Substituted 
Decision-Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157 (2010). 
 2. I will use the terms “psychosocial impairments,” “psychosocial disabilities,” or 
“psychosocial conditions,” which are preferred over the more commonly used term of “mental 
illness.”  See, e.g., Anna Lawson, People with Psychosocial Impairments or Conditions, 
Reasonable Accommodation and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 26 
LAW IN CONTEXT, no. 2, 2008, at 62, 81 n.2. 
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Act3 (ADA) and the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities4 (CRPD) provide legal and/or normative bases for a 
right to receive decision-making support as a less restrictive alternative to 
the substituted decision making that characterizes guardianship. 
Part I of this article sets out the basic analytical framework provided by 
the integration mandate of Title II of the ADA and Article 12 of the CRPD.  
Part II discusses the inadequacies of recent guardianship reforms to address 
what is characterized here as the “constructive isolation of guardianship” 
and the particular reasons why the current guardianship model presents 
particular cause for concern when the subject of the proceeding is a person 
with a psychosocial disability.  Part III describes supported decision-making 
models that have been implemented in other countries and explains how 
they differ from reformed guardianship regimes in this country.  Finally, Part 
IV briefly outlines the basic structure of an ADA integration mandate 
challenge to a state’s failure to provide assistance with decision making in a 
less restrictive and less isolating manner than is currently provided under 
guardianship. 
The movement to require support with decision making, now enshrined 
in the CRPD, requires a reconsideration of traditional notions of “legal 
capacity” and forces us to alter our conception of the obligation to address 
the needs of persons with diminished decision-making abilities.5  Riding the 
 
 3. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).  The ADA claim 
is based on the integration mandate of Title II of the Act, 28 C.F.R § 35.130(d) (2009), and 
built on the reasoning in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), and 
subsequent decisions interpreting the integration mandate. 
 4. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Mar. 
30, 2007, G.A. Res. 61/106, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter 
CRPD]. 
 5. See, e.g., John Brayley, Dir. External Organisations, Div. of Mental Health, Flinders 
University, Supported Decision-Making in Australia 1, 10-16 (Dec. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.opa.sa.gov.au/documents/08_News_&_Articles/Supported%20Decision%20Maki
ng.pdf (noting that supported decision-making requires a modified definition of “capacity” as 
“the ability, with assistance as needed, to understand the nature and consequences of a 
decision within the context of the available range of choices, and to communicate that 
decision, with assistance as needed”).  Further: 
. . . [C]apacity can also mean the ability to express one’s intention and to 
communicate one’s personhood (wishes, vision for the future, needs, strengths, 
personal attachments and field of care), to a trusted group of others chosen by the 
individual who, in a fiduciary relationship of trust, confidence and responsibility 
recognize the individual as a full person, and commit to acting on and representing 
that person’s agency in accordance with his/her intentions and personhood. 
Id. (citing Michael Bach, Exec. Vice President, Can. Ass’n for Cmty. Living, What Does Article 
12 of the CRPD Require?:  Theoretical Starting Points and Questions/Implications for Law and 
Policy (Jul. 2009) (slide show at 27), available at http://www.inclusionireland.ie/Capacity 
RoundtableAug2009.asp). 
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wave of this incipient revolution, this article concludes that as a matter of 
morality and policy, and possibly as a matter of law, states in this country 
should be expanding existing programs or developing new ones that might 
serve as acceptable and appropriate alternatives for the substituted decision 
making of guardianship.  By analyzing guardianship through the lens of the 
integration mandate we are forced to consider whether guardianship 
unnecessarily isolates a person from the opportunity for crucial social, legal, 
and financial interactions, and whether there are appropriate and viable 
alternatives to guardianship that would reduce that isolation by enabling the 
individual to more actively participate in the decision-making process. An 
extension of the integration mandate to the realm of decision making should 
be an integral part of current efforts to expand community-based services for 
persons with psychosocial disabilities, leading to enhanced opportunities for 
persons with disabilities, and a greater respect for the inherent dignity of all 
persons.6  Ultimately, the legal standards used to determine when the state 
will remove an individual’s decision-making rights and the way the state 
provides assistance to those with limitations in decision-making ability 
influences the way our society conceives of mental disabilities and the social 
obligation to fully integrate all people with disabilities into mainstream 
communal life.7 
I.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADA AND THE 
CRPD SUPPORT A REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO 
GUARDIANSHIP 
Both the ADA and the CRPD seek to outlaw disability-based 
discrimination by prohibiting both active and passive discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.  The ADA was enacted in 1990 to provide a 
clear and broad national mandate to eliminate discrimination,8 and to go 
further than prior legislation to provide equal access to goods, services, and 
  
 
 6. See Stanley S. Herr, Self Determination, Autonomy, and Alternatives for Guardianship, 
in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 429, 447-48 (Stanley S. Herr, 
Lawrence O. Gostin & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2003). 
 7. Salzman, supra note 1, at 195. 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III) (1990), at 26, reprinted 
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 449; 134 CONG. REC. 9384 (1988).  See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. 
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002).  See also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2006) (noting that in 
enacting the ADA, Congress was relying on its broad authority to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment and to regulate commerce). 
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opportunities9 as a fundamental civil right.10  By explicitly recognizing the 
“right [of all persons with disabilities] to fully participate in all aspects of 
society,”11 the ADA was intended to create a new future of inclusion and 
integration.12 
A challenge to guardianship would fall within the proscription of Title II 
of the ADA.  Title II prohibits public entities from engaging in disability-
based discrimination in their services, programs, or activities.13  Under the 
related integration mandate, those public services, programs, and activities 
must be administered in “the most integrated setting appropriate to the 
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities,”14 i.e., one “that enables 
individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest 
extent possible.”15  Public entities must make reasonable modifications in 
policies, practices, or procedures to avoid disability-based discrimination, 
unless those modifications would “fundamentally alter” the service, 
program, or activity at issue.16 
In Olmstead v. L.C., a case challenging the plaintiffs’ unjustified 
confinement in a state psychiatric facility, the Supreme Court relied on the 
ADA’s integration mandate to conclude that the unjustified segregation and 
isolation of people with disabilities may constitute unlawful discrimination.17  
While the Court’s Olmstead decision is unquestionably linked to the fact of 
the plaintiffs’ segregation in a physical institution, the Court issued a broad 
holding that can be imported to other, comparable contexts: “[u]njustified 
 
 9. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(7) (West 2010).  See, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 
325, 331 (3rd Cir. 1995) (citing Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act:  
Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 413, 430-31 (1991) (discussing limitations of Section 504’s non-discrimination 
mandate)). 
 10. See Michael A. Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1206-08 (2007) (observing that under the ADA equal access is not 
intended to be a “special benefit,” but rather “a basic right”). 
 11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(1). 
 12. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 588-89, 589 n.1 (1999) (citing 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2), (3), (5) (1999) (noting that the ADA was unique in specifically 
identifying the segregation of persons with disabilities as a type of discrimination that Congress 
sought to eliminate)).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332; H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 49–50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 472-73; 135 CONG. REC. 19803 (1989) (comments of Senator Harkin, 
floor manager of the ADA in the Senate). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006). 
 14. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2009). 
 15. 28 C.F.R. Part 35, app. A, subpart B (2009).  The Department of Justice explains the 
comprehensive nature of the integration mandate.  See id. at 568-69 (discussing the 
integration mandate in context of the requirements of Section 35.130(b)(1)(iv)). 
 16. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). 
 17. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 596-97. 
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isolation, we hold, is properly regarded as discrimination based on 
disability.”18 
Most important and relevant for the guardianship context, in concluding 
that unjustified isolation might constitute disability-related discrimination, the 
Court in Olmstead expressed the concern that segregation would perpetuate 
demeaning stereotypes about the abilities and human value of persons with 
disabilities and diminish their opportunities to enjoy the pleasures and 
benefits of participating in significant aspects of human and social life.19  
The same can be said about guardianship.  And while there is a clear and 
obvious difference between the more severe isolation resulting from physical 
segregation in an institution and the isolation from the community that 
results from guardianship, there are inescapable parallels between these two 
forms of state-sanctioned isolation.  Whether an individual with a guardian20 
resides in a community setting or an institution, guardianship stands as a 
barrier to an individual’s full participation in the host of every day human 
activities cited by the Olmstead court,21 and perpetuates assumptions that 
the ward is “incapable or unworthy of participating in community life.”22  
The Olmstead decision reaffirms and reinforces the affirmative obligation 
created by the ADA to integrate individuals with disabilities into social, 
economic, and political life to the greatest extent possible, and provides a 
theoretical basis for a right to less restrictive and less isolating alternatives to 
the substituted decision making of guardianship. 
Such a right is consistent with the guiding principles of, and the rights 
created by, the landmark 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.23  The CRPD is predicated on the obligation to respect each 
 
 18. Id. at 597.  But see id. at 587 (articulating the relevant question as whether the ADA 
“may require placement of persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in 
institutions”). 
 19. Id. at 596, 600-01.  The Court found that: 
. . . [I]nstitutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community 
settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable 
or unworthy of participating in community life.  . . . [C]onfinement in an institution 
severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, 
social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, 
and cultural enrichment. 
Id. at 600–01 (citations omitted). 
 20. An “incapacitated person” for whom a guardian has been appointed will be referred 
to herein as a “ward.” 
 21. See infra Part II (discussing the constructive isolation of guardianship). 
 22. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600. 
 23. See CRPD, supra note 4, at art. 12.  As of June 5, 2011, 148 nations have signed 
the treaty, and 100 have ratified it.  Convention and Optional Protocol Signatures and 
Ratifications, U.N. ENABLE, http://www.un.org/disabilities/countries.asp?id=166#U (last 
visited June 5, 2011).  While the United States signed the treaty in July 2009, it has not yet 
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person’s inherent dignity, autonomy, and independence, including the 
freedom to make one’s own choices, and, like the ADA, the right of each 
individual to fully and effectively participate in all aspects of social life.24  
The CRPD broadly defines disability-based discrimination to protect the wide 
range of recognized human rights25 and obligates State Parties to “take 
‘immediate, effective and appropriate’ steps to raise awareness of the 
capabilities of disabled people and to counter unfounded stereotypes and 
prejudices against them.”26 
Article 12 of the CRPD recognizes the right of all persons to exercise 
legal capacity and to receive support to exercise that capacity, if, and only 
to the extent that assistance is needed.27  While Article 12 neither endorses 
nor prohibits guardianship, it provides that any measures that limit an 
individual’s exercise of legal capacity must “respect the rights, will and 
preferences of the person [receiving support], [must be] free of conflict of 
interest and undue influence, [must be] proportional and tailored to the 
person’s circumstances, [must] apply for the shortest time possible and [must 
be] subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial 
authority or judicial body.”28 
 
ratified it.  Id.  Nevertheless, as an international treaty it provides an appropriate source of 
normative guidance.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).  In light of the 
possibility that this nation might ratify the convention in the future, it is appropriate to consider 
what modifications of existing law would be required to bring our nation into compliance with 
its requirements. 
 24. CRPD, supra note 4, at art. 3; Tina Minkowitz, The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to Be Free from Nonconsensual Psychiatric 
Interventions, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 405, 408-09 (2007) [hereinafter Minkowitz, 
U.N. Convention].  See Michael Perlin, “A Change is Gonna Come”:  The Implications of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice 
of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 483-84, 490 (2009). 
 25. CRPD, supra note 4, at art. 2 (defining “discrimination on the basis of disability” as 
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or 
effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with 
others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field.”). 
 26. Lawson, supra note 2, at 77.  See also CRPD, supra note 4, at art. 8(1). 
 27. See CRPD, supra note 4, at art. 12; Amita Dhanda, Constructing a New Human 
Rights Lexicon:  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, SUR INT’L J. ON HUM. 
RTS., June 2008, at 43, 47-48, available at http://www.surjournal.org/eng/conteudos/ 
getArtigo8.php?artigo=8,artigo_dhanda.htm (characterizing the CRPD article 12 as a model 
of interdependence that allows for both capacity and support); Annegret Kämpf, The 
Disabilities Convention and Its Consequences for Mental Health Laws in Australia, 26 LAW IN 
CONTEXT, no. 2, 2008, at 10, 31. 
 28. CRPD, supra note 4, at art. 12(4). 
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The CRPD represents a paradigm shift; it creates a true presumption of 
“legal capacity”29 and calls for a “more nuanced approach” towards 
determining decision-making status and greater reflection on how to assist 
an individual within the decision-making process.30  Most significantly, the 
CRPD changes the locus of decision-making authority—from the guardian 
to the individual needing support. 
In addition, Article 12 of the CRPD begins to address the judicial and 
social tendency to more readily provide accommodations needed to 
overcome barriers to physical disabilities than those needed to overcome 
barriers to mental disabilities.31  While all persons with disabilities continue 
to confront barriers to integration and participation, as a society we seem 
better able to grasp the barriers affecting persons with physical and sensory 
impairments such as impassable stairs or printed materials and the 
accommodations needed to overcome them, such as ramps, elevators or 
talking computers.  We are less adept at understanding the barriers 
affecting individuals with mental disabilities, such as the need for assistance 
with decision-making, and the precise nature and appropriate contours of 
the support needed to overcome these barriers.  Unless we are going to 
exclude persons with mental disabilities from many of the benefits of our 
disability discrimination laws, however, it is necessary to reconsider the 
failure to provide accommodations such as support with decision making.  
Just as we don’t carry a person up the stairs but provide assistance so that 
she can overcome that barrier on her own, we should not assign an 
individual with limitations in decision-making abilities a guardian to make 
decisions for her, but should provide decision-making support so that she 
can make her own decisions whenever possible. 
Both the ADA and the CRPD are predicated on principles of human 
dignity, inclusion, and participation.  They create norms, and may (today, or 
upon ratification of the CRPD) create legal rights to support for individuals 
with disabilities who need assistance with decision making as an alternative 
to the surrogate decision-making model of guardianship.  Such support 
would provide a critically important alternative for persons with psychosocial 
conditions. 
 
 29. See CRPD, supra note 4, at art. 12; Minkowitz, U.N. Convention, supra note 24, at 
408-09. 
 30. Kämpf, supra note 27, at 31 (quoting GERARD QUINN & THERESIA DEGENER, UNITED 
NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY:  THE CURRENT USE AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF UNITED 
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISABILITY 16 (2002)). 
 31. See Lawson, supra note 2, at 68-69 (discussing reasons for this disparity). 
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II.  GUARDIANSHIP UNJUSTIFIABLY ISOLATES PERSONS WITH PSYCHOSOCIAL 
CONDITIONS DESPITE RECENT REFORMS 
A. A Historical Perspective on the Treatment of Persons with Mental 
Illness32 in the United States 
The justification for guardianship rests on the historical and well-
recognized obligation of the state as parens patriae to protect the person 
and property of citizens who are deemed to be unable to meet their own 
needs.33  The way in which the state exercises its parens patriae authority, 
however, is greatly influenced by long-standing negative conceptions of 
mental illness.  In order to understand the influences operating in the context 
of guardianship for persons with psychosocial disability, it is necessary to 
understand the historical conceptions of, and approaches to treatment for, 
mental illness. 
Mental illness has long been associated with evil, divine punishment, 
sin, and possession by demons.34 These associations helped generate the 
stigma of mental illness and fueled assumptions that persons with mental 
illness were predisposed to violence.35 
The nineteenth century brought with it the notion that mental illness 
caused global “incompetence,” affecting an individual’s cognitive abilities in 
every area of functioning, generally for the person’s entire lifetime, justifying 
institutional segregation of “insane persons” under fairly wretched 
conditions.36  At the same time, there were some efforts to improve the 
 
 32. The term “mental illness” is deliberately used in this historical perspective section. 
 33. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 332 (1993); Jennifer L. Wright, Protecting Who 
from What, and Why, and How:  A Proposal for an Integrative Approach to Adult Protective 
Proceedings, 12 ELDER L.J. 53, 58, 63, 66 (2004) [hereinafter Wright, Proposal for an 
Integrative Approach] (discussing adult guardianship and parens patriae civil commitment 
proceedings in the United States).  See generally Joan L. O’Sullivan, Role of the Attorney for 
the Alleged Incapacitated Person, 31 STETSON L. REV. 687, 689–92.  The modern state 
obligation as parens patriae to provide care and protection for vulnerable individuals with 
mental disabilities traces back to the obligation of the English king to protect the property of 
those with intermittent mental incapacity (“lunatics”).  See Heller, 509 U.S. at 332. 
 34. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION:  A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE 
OF REASON 15 (Random House, Inc. 1965) (1961); MICHAEL PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE:  
MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 36 (2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE]. 
 35. JOHN PETRILA & JEFFREY SWANSON, MENTAL ILLNESS, LAW, AND A PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 
RESEARCH AGENDA 8 (2010), available at http://www.publichealthlawresearch.org/theory-
practice-and-evidence/law-mental-illness-and-public-health-law-research-agenda. 
 36. BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT:  A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 103 
(2005).  See also David Braddock & Susan Parish, Social Policy Toward Intellectual Disabilities 
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH 
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES, supra note 6, at 83, 84-86 (discussing treatment of persons with 
mental illness). 
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generally deplorable institutional conditions by providing more “benevolent” 
(though not necessarily less paternalistic) treatment in open asylums, often 
located in pastoral settings, with the goal of curing insanity through 
wholesome measures such as good diet and hygiene, medical care, 
occupational activities, and religious practice.37  This goal of providing 
benevolent treatment to the mentally ill was short-lived; these asylums 
became increasingly overcrowded and their mission of treatment changed to 
focus on the management and control of the swelling institutional 
population.38  As the institutional mission changed, cure rates necessarily 
declined, and psychiatrists began to report that mental illness could rarely 
be cured.39  By the middle of the twentieth century, individuals with severe 
mental illness were confined in large, overcrowded, and understaffed 
institutions away from their communities where they were treated with drugs 
and invasive therapies, often with long-term detrimental consequences, for 
the primary purpose of managing their behavior.40 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, successful litigation challenging 
institutional conditions41 along with philosophical changes favoring 
treatment in the community led to large-scale deinstitutionalization and the 
 
 37. PETRILA & SWANSON, supra note 35.  See Braddock & Parish, supra note 36. 
 38. See id.; Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration:  Lessons from the 
Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s 10-11 (Univ. of Chi. L. & Econ. Olin 
Working Paper No. 542, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab 
stract_id=1748796 (observing that during the period from the late nineteenth century to the 
mid-twentieth century the overall population confined in psychiatric facilities grew 
exponentially from approximately 41,000 to 500,000 (a thirteen-fold increase), with a related 
dramatic growth in the number of persons living in individual institutions). 
 39. See Braddock & Parish, supra note 36, at 86. 
 40. PETRILA & SWANSON, supra note 35, at 8-9.  See generally Thomas Szasz, Summary 
Statement and Manifesto, THOMAS S. SZASZ, M.D. CYBERCENTER FOR LIBERTY & RESPONSIBILITY 
(1998), http://www.szasz.com/manifesto.html (theorizing that “psychosocial disability” is 
simply a social construct that allows us to segregate those who we find offensive or threatening 
under the guise of medical treatment). 
 41. See PETRILA & SWANSON, supra note 35, at 9-10, 12.  See also Lessard v. Schmidt, 
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084, 1093, 1101 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on 
procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), judgment reentered, 379 F. Supp 1376 (E.D. Wis. 
1974), vacated and remanded on procedural grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), judgment 
reentered, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (requiring due process safeguards in the civil 
commitment process and requiring proof of dangerousness for civil commitment).  After the 
initial success of litigation to constrain the state’s use of its coercive power and to impose a 
duty to provide care, however, courts “lately have revitalized the state’s coercive powers in the 
interest of identifying and ameliorating perceived risks to the public while limiting the state’s 
duties in the context of community care.”  PETRILA & SWANSON, supra note 35, at 7. 
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closing of certain facilities.42  This deinstitutionalization was facilitated, in 
part, by the availability of new psychotropic medications and by new streams 
of funding for community-based care.43  Despite these advances, however, 
community resources remained quite limited and proved insufficient to meet 
the increased need for services.44  Consequently, although individuals were 
given the benefit of residing outside large psychiatric institutions, many were 
left without adequate care and treatment in the community setting.45  This 
shortage of adequate mental health services in the community continues to 
the present time, exacerbating the stigma of mental illness and the fear and 
suspicion of persons with psychosocial disability.46  It is not surprising, then, 
that when the ADA was being drafted and debated, a group of conservative 
legislators sought to exclude schizophrenia and manic depression from 
coverage under the Act.47  While the effort was unsuccessful,48 it 
underscores the deep-seated prejudice against persons with severe 
psychosocial disability and suggests that it is more entrenched than other 
forms of disability-related stigma. 
This history helps to explain the differential treatment of persons with 
psychosocial disabilities within our legal system.  It helps to explain why, in 
the context of psychosocial disabilities, many adhere to the notion that the 
disability rests within the individual and is an inherent and unavoidable 
aspect of his or her condition, i.e., the “medical model of disability.”49  As a 
result, despite recent research indicating that persons with severe 
psychosocial disability retain the capacity to make important personal 
 
 42. PETRILA & SWANSON, supra note 35, at 10, 12.  See also Harcourt, supra note 38, at 
2 (noting a seventy-five percent decline of inpatient population in mental health facilities from 
1955-1980). 
 43. PETRILA & SWANSON, supra note 35, at 12. 
 44. See id. at 13 (noting that “the new medicines proved less than magical; life in the 
community failed to cure schizophrenia; and President Reagan effectively defunded the 
community mental health centers . . . .”). 
 45. THE PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING THE PROMISE:  
TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA  3-4 (2003), available at http://www.nami. 
org/Template.cfm?Section=Policy&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&Co
ntentID=16699 (citing the lack of consistent and appropriate community-based mental health 
services as barriers to recovery). 
 46. Lawson, supra note 2, at 77. 
 47. PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at 182-83 (citing Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., 
The Americans with Disabilities Act:  Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil 
Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 451-52 (1991)). 
 48. See id. at 183 (citing 135 CONG. REC. S10765-86 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989)). 
 49. Lawson, supra note 2, at 68-69 (discussing the goal of moving from this medical 
model of disability to a social model that focuses on what society needs to do to remove 
barriers to full participation by persons with disabilities). 
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decisions,50 many in our society, including judges, still make assumptions 
about a general incapacity of persons with psychosocial disability and 
underestimate their abilities.51  An understanding of this historical 
perspective is critical when considering the legality and propriety of 
guardianship for persons with psychosocial conditions. 
B. “The Constructive Isolation of Guardianship” 
The argument in this article rests on the assumption that guardianship 
unnecessarily isolates individuals with psychosocial impairments.  
Guardianship implicates a host of decisions that define who we are as 
human beings—where and with whom we live and spend time, whether we 
can travel, marry, and how, or if, we manage our money and resources.52  
In some states, the appointment of a guardian continues to disenfranchise 
the ward.53  Also,  guardianship laws authorize the court to empower the 
 
 50. See Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence 
Study. III:  Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 149, 171 (1995). 
 51. See, e.g., PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at 156, 173; Amita Dhanda, 
Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention:  Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the 
Future?, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 429, 432 (2007) (discussing status attribution model 
for determining incapacity); Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study:  
Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 137, 153 (1996). 
 52. See WINSOR C. SCHMIDT, JR., GUARDIANSHIP:  COURT OF LAST RESORT FOR THE ELDERLY 
AND DISABLED 5-6 (1995).  See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22 (McKinney 2009) 
(providing that in New York, a guardian may be granted the power to make decisions 
regarding the ward’s routine or major medical or dental treatment, personal care, social 
environment, travel, driving, access to confidential records, education, benefits, and place of 
abode). 
 53. Fourteen states still have laws or constitutional provisions limiting the right to vote 
based on a finding of some type of mental “incapacity” or guardianship status.  State Laws 
Affecting the Voting Rights of People with Mental Disabilities, BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL 
HEALTH LAW, available at http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=1kgFTxMFHZE%3d 
&tabid=315.  See ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177(b) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2010 
amendments); ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2(C); LA. CONST. art. I, § 10(A); MD. CONST. art. I, § 4; 
MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2; NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1; N.Y. ELEC. LAW 
§ 5-106(6) (2008); S.C. CONST. art. II, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 
6; VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 4-1; WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6.  In contrast, 
nineteen states specifically provide that an individual under guardianship retains the right to 
vote, unless such a right was specifically removed by the guardianship court.  See A.B.A. 
COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, STATE ADULT GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION: DIRECTIONS OF REFORM – 
2010 7 (2010),  http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/aging/PublicDocu 
ments/2010_leg_update.authcheckdam.pdf (last updated Dec. 2010) [hereinafter STATE 
ADULT GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION].  See generally A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, REPORT 
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES:  RECOMMENDATION 1 (August 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/aging/voting/pdfs/voting_rec_final_
approved.authcheckdam.pdf (urging amendment of all state laws that disenfranchise citizens 
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guardian to make medical decisions, including decisions of critical 
importance to persons with psychosocial impairments, such as those 
regarding the administration of antipsychotic medications or 
electroconvulsive therapy.54 
Most state guardianship statutes prohibit the guardian from consenting 
to the ward’s involuntary commitment to a psychiatric facility, and require 
that the guardian follow the state’s involuntary commitment procedures.55  It 
appears, however, that a small minority of states still permit a guardian to 
consent to involuntary commitment to a mental health facility at least for 
certain limited time periods.56 
 
in the absence of an explicit determination of incapacity to vote).  Even in states that protect a 
citizen’s right to vote despite the appointment of a guardian, individuals with mental 
impairments may still be denied the right to vote due to general confusion among voting 
officials.  See Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 807, 811 (8th 
Cir. 2007). 
 54. See, e.g., UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 315(a)(4) 
(1997) [hereinafter UGPPA]; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.03(i), 81.22(a)(8); In re 
Guardianship of E.L., 911 A.2d 35, 41 (N.H. 2006) (speaking to the compulsory nature of 
the medical guardianship as the explanation of why the ward was compliant with a medication 
regime to which he objected).  However, states may require that the guardian follow certain 
state statutory or common law procedures for authorizing the involuntary administration of 
psychotropic medications or electroconclusive therapy (ECT).  See UGPPA § 316, Comments 
(noting that some states may require a guardian to follow mandated state procedures for 
certain involuntary medical treatment such as forced administration of psychotropic 
medications).  See In re Rhodanna, 823 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) 
(concluding, sixteen years after the new guardianship law went into effect, that an individual 
who objects to a guardian’s decision to administer psychotropic medications or 
electroconvulsive therapy has a due process right to an adversarial hearing to challenge the 
decision that he or she lacks capacity to make treatment decisions as well as the propriety of 
the proposed decision).  But see John Monahan et al., Use of Leverage to Improve Adherence 
to Psychiatric Treatment in the Community, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERV.  37, 37-44 (2005) (noting 
that while in most states a guardian may not administer psychotropic medications over the 
ward’s objections without complying with the state’s general rules for involuntary 
administration of psychiatric medication, guardianship may be used to condition receipt of 
money on continued compliance with treatment). 
 55. Guardianship laws in nearly forty states and the UGPPA either explicitly prohibit a 
court from authorizing a guardian to involuntarily commit a ward to a mental health treatment 
facility, or do not empower the guardian to consent to involuntary institutional commitment, 
and appear to require guardians to follow the state’s procedures for involuntary commitment.  
See A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, GUARDIAN AUTHORITY FOR RESIDENTIAL DECISIONS:  STATE 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS (AS OF AUGUST 2010), available at http://new.abanet.org/aging/Public 
Documents/guard_auth_res_dec_8_2010.pdf (last updated 2010) [hereinafter GUARDIAN 
AUTHORITY FOR RESIDENTIAL DECISIONS]; UGPPA § 316(d). 
 56. Guardianship laws in twelve states permit a guardian to consent to involuntary 
commitment to a mental health facility at least for certain time periods.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14-5312.01(B) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-303(a)(1) (LEXIS through Oct. 
26, 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.660 (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 475.120(5) (2000) (a 
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By limiting an individual’s right to make decisions, guardianship divests 
the individual of the ability to make crucial self-defining decisions.  In doing 
so, guardianship can also remove the individual from a host of interactions 
involved in decision making and segregate him from many critical aspects of 
social, economic and political life.  An individual who is divested of the right 
to make financial decisions becomes gradually disengaged from the 
management of those finances as well as the interactions with others 
involved in that management—banking, shopping, financial planning, the 
sale and management of property, and even giving gifts to loved ones.  The 
restrictions on one’s ability to manage one’s own finances, can also restrict 
the individual’s ability to engage in a variety of activities that require 
expenditures of money.  If the individual is divested of the legal right to 
make his own medical decisions, he may find that medical decisions are 
made without or around him; he may get little information about his 
condition or treatment options, and may, as a result, be essentially 
disregarded in that decision-making process.  A guardianship order can 
also isolate the individual by explicitly depriving a ward of the right to make 
certain social decisions regarding how or with whom he will spend time.  
And if, as a result of guardianship, the ward’s participation in various 
decisions is no longer required, the ward’s desires and preferences may 
rarely be solicited, leading to further isolation. 
Further, guardianship may be fairly anti-therapeutic in the case of 
individuals with psychosocial disability, both because of the adverse 
consequences of the incapacity label and because the individual may be 
removed from the important and beneficial process of medical decision 
making.  As a result of the incapacity determination the individual 
 
guardian can seek admission for thirty days without court order then must follow state 
procedures for involuntary commitment); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.113(1)(O), (6) (West 
2011) (requiring special court authorization permitting guardian to place ward in secured 
residential long-term care facility unless court granted such power at the time of initial 
appointment); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-56(d) (2011) (“to the extent specifically ordered by the 
court”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 464-A:25(I)(a) (2011) (permitting guardian to admit ward to a 
state institution with prior court approval or the certification of a psychiatrist); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 35A-1241(2) (2005) (empowering guardian to  consent to placement of ward in a 
treatment facility when “appropriate,” though providing that guardian should give preference 
to a community-based treatment facility); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-12(2) 
(1996) (empowering guardian to place individual in a treatment facility for up to forty-
five days and then requiring guardian to follow state procedures for involuntary 
commitment); OR. REV. STAT. § 125.320(3)(a) (2007) (a guardian can consent to involuntary 
commitment to a mental health facility, but must give notice to the courts); VA. CODE ANN. § 
2.2-713 (2008) (guardians may authorize temporary admission to a mental health facility in 
certain circumstances); WIS. STAT. § 54.25(2)(d)(2)(n) (2008) (a guardian can apply for 
protective placement).  See also GUARDIAN AUTHORITY FOR RESIDENTIAL DECISIONS, supra note 
55; STATE ADULT GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION, supra note 53. 
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experiences a sense of helplessness and loss of control, with critical 
implications for psychological well-being.57  “A finding of incapacity may 
accentuate a patient’s difficulties, making him or her feel even more 
stigmatized and lacking in control” and diminishing his or her motivation to 
act in the world and to test, retain, or develop competencies.58  Thus, the 
loss of legal capacity may add to the challenges of re-integration into all 
aspects of social life after a mental health crisis. 
Further, in those cases where the court transfers medical decision-
making rights to the guardian—even where the individual does not overtly 
object to treatment—the ward may be deprived of the significant therapeutic 
benefits associated with meaningful participation in medical decisions.  First, 
this participation contributes to the individual’s sense of dignity and the 
notion that he or she is being taken seriously in the process.59  Second, 
where the clinician understands that the individual must be taken seriously in 
the treatment consent process, the clinician and patient are more likely to 
have a meaningful dialogue about treatment options, thereby strengthening 
the critically important clinician-patient relationship.60  The evidence 
indicates that this dialogue enables the clinician and patient to assess the 
efficacy and suitability of the treatment plan, increasing compliance with the 
 
 57. See Salzman, supra note 1, at 169-70; Wright, Proposal for an Integrative Approach, 
supra note 33, at 77-79 (citations omitted).  For an insightful and thoughtful discussion of the 
need to study and carefully consider whether and under what circumstances guardianship 
actually succeeds in maintaining and/or improving the “physical, mental and spiritual health, 
longevity, functional capacity, and self-reported sense of well-being” of persons subject to 
guardianship’s protection, see Jennifer L. Wright, Guardianship for Your Own Good:  
Improving the Well-Being of Respondents and Wards in the USA, 33 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 
350, 353 (2010) [hereinafter Wright, Guardianship for Your Own Good]. 
 58. Mary Donnelly, From Autonomy to Dignity:  Treatment for Mental Disorders and the 
Focus for Patient Rights, 26 LAW IN CONTEXT, no. 2, 2008, at 37, 49-50. 
 59. PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at 280.  See generally Tom R. Tyler, The 
Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures:  Implications for Civil Commitment 
Hearings, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 433, 433-34 (1992) (observing that in the context of civil 
commitment hearings, individuals with psychosocial disabilities derive therapeutic benefits 
from a process that is fair, permits their participation, and treats them with dignity, and that the 
absence of these procedural characteristics is likely to cause “social malaise and [decrease] 
people’s willingness to be integrated into the polity . . . .”). 
 60. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 45, at 
27, 29; Donnelly, supra note 58, at 50; Penny Weller, Supported Decision-Making and the 
Achievement of Non-Discrimination:  The Promise and Paradox of the Disabilities Convention, 
26 LAW IN CONTEXT, no. 2, 2008, at 85, 102 (observing in the context of the creation of 
psychiatric advance directives that persons with severe psychosocial disabilities find that the 
meaningful discussion of treatment options enhances the working alliance between patient 
and provider, with benefits for treatment compliance); Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse 
Mental Health Treatment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 17 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 99, 
111-12 (1994). 
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agreed-upon treatment protocol and minimizing psychiatric crises or 
improving their management if they do occur.61  This type of regular 
dialogue between treatment providers and the consumer enhances the 
individual’s treatment and well-being. 
By excluding the individual with psychosocial disabilities from the 
decision-making process, guardianship can exacerbate the person’s 
marginalization and isolation from mainstream society.  Allowing an 
individual to retain the authority to make self-defining personal decisions, 
while providing assistance in the process when needed, is not only more 
respectful of individual dignity and autonomy than guardianship, it also 
enables the person to remain actively engaged in the full range of life’s 
activities and maximize his or her capacities. 
C. Guardianship Continues to be Unnecessarily Isolating Despite Reforms 
There is no question that over the last two decades, guardianship laws 
throughout the United States have benefitted from significant substantive 
and procedural reforms that are more protective of the alleged 
incapacitated person’s rights and seek to protect and respect the individual’s 
autonomy and self-determination.62  Procedurally, states have enacted 
important reforms addressing the mandatory contents of the guardianship 
petition,63 enhanced service requirements,64 the possible appointment of 
counsel,65 the use of impartial court evaluators or visitors,66 and post-
appointment reporting and monitoring procedures.67  Substantively, states 
 
 61. See PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at 280; PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM 
COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 45, at 27, 29; Jeffrey Swanson et al., Psychiatric 
Advance Directives Among Public Mental Health Consumers in Five U.S. Cities:  Prevalence, 
Demand, and Correlates, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 43, 44 nn.10-15 (2006).  See generally 
Brayley, supra note 5, at 3 (observing the therapeutic benefits of the meaningful and calm 
exploration of options). 
 62. For an excellent guide to the variations in state adult guardianship laws, see State 
Guardianship Laws & Updates, A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/law_aging/resources/guardianship_law_practice.html (last visited June 5, 
2011). 
 63. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.08 (2006); UGPPA § 303 (1997).  See 
generally A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, INITIATION OF GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS, 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/aging/PublicDocu 
ments/chart_cap_initiation_08_10.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited June 5, 2011) (comparing 
required petition elements in all state laws). 
 64. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.07; UGPPA § 308. 
 65. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10; UGPPA §§ 305(b), 406(b). 
 66. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09; UGPPA §§ 305(a), 406(a). 
 67. Oversight and monitoring of guardianships is critical to ensure the integrity of the 
process.  See UGPPA § 317(a), (c) (requiring guardian reports within thirty days of 
appointment and annually thereafter); UGPPA §§ 418(c), 419, 420 (requiring a property 
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have moved from a medical to a functional definition of “incapacity,”68 
have adopted a higher “clear and convincing” burden of proof,69 require 
some exploration of less restrictive existing alternatives prior to 
appointment,70 and require that the guardianship order be narrowly tailored 
to meet the individual’s specific needs (i.e., limited guardianships).71 
Together, these substantive and procedural reforms make it less likely 
that an unnecessary guardianship petition will be filed and less likely that a 
guardian will be appointed when one is not necessary.  Yet problems 
remain—both due to the continuing failure to implement enacted reforms 
and because the reforms are not sufficient to address the problems inherent 
in the guardianship paradigm.  Consequently, we routinely see overly broad 
or unnecessary guardianship orders for a variety of reasons including the 
court’s general culture of protection, the focus on the incapacity 
determination, and the frequent lack of available less restrictive 
alternatives.72 
 
guardian to file a plan and inventory property within sixty days of appointment and to file 
subsequent annual reports that include a recommendation as to whether guardianship or 
conservatorship should be continued or modified).  See generally A.B.A. COMM’N ON LAW & 
AGING, MONITORING FOLLOWING GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS (AS OF DEC. 31, 2009), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/aging/PublicDocu 
ments/chart_monitoring_08_10.authcheckdam.pdf (comparing significant elements of each 
state’s guardianship monitoring system) (last visited June 5, 2011). 
 68. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(b) (defining “incapacity” as the inability to 
care for self or manage property and to adequately understand the risks and consequences of 
that inability, along with a likelihood of resulting harm); UGPPA § 102(5) (defining an 
“incapacitated person” as “an individual . . . unable to receive and evaluate information or 
make or communicate decisions to such an extent that the individual lacks the ability to meet 
essential requirements for physical health, safety, or self-care, even with appropriate 
technological assistance.”). 
 69. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.12; UGPPA §§ 311(a)(1), 401(2)(a) (requiring 
clear and convincing evidence of “incapacity”). 
 70. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(a)(2) (providing that guardianship order 
should constitute the “least restrictive form of intervention”); UGPPA § 311(a)(1)(B) (requiring 
determination that “respondent’s identified needs cannot be met by less restrictive means”). 
 71. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.02(a)(2), 81.29(a) (“incapacitated person” 
retains all powers and rights not specifically granted to the guardian); UGPPA §§ 311(b), 401 
(guardianship order should remove only those rights that the “incapacitated” person can no 
longer exercise on her own). 
 72. See Wright, Guardianship for Your Own Good, supra note 57, at 353-54 (observing 
that many fundamental guardianship reforms conflict with the interests of the active players in 
the system, while the person who should most benefit from the reforms—the subject of the 
proceeding—is the person with the least actual voice and role in the proceeding).  Available 
research indicates that guardianship petitions are usually granted.  See id. at 359 (citations 
omitted); Wright, Proposal for an Integrative Approach, supra note 33, at 82-83 (citing to 
studies from the 1990’s that found that guardianship petitions were granted in 91% and 94% 
of the cases, respectively) (citations omitted).  It is generally difficult to draw precise 
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The evidence indicates that courts do not utilize limited guardianships as 
often as they are warranted.73  Courts may enter overly broad guardianship 
orders for a number of reasons, including: a judicial habit or culture of 
entering broad orders;74 the additional time and effort required to conduct a 
meaningful assessment of the individual’s different “capacities;”75 the fact 
that the court first considers whether a person is “incapacitated” and then 
drafts the order, making it more likely that the court would enter a broadly 
protective order;76 and because the entry of a broad order both avoids 
confusion about the scope of the guardian’s authority and the need for 
future proceedings to expand a more limited initial order.77  Yet, even in 
 
conclusions about the nature of guardianship decisions, however, because most decisions are 
not published and the proceedings are generally closed to the general public.  See Pamela B. 
Teaster et al., Wards of the State:  A National Study of Public Guardianship, 37 STETSON L. 
REV. 193, 200 (2007) (citation omitted). 
  With regard to less restrictive available resources that are considered as alternatives 
to the appointment of a guardian, courts look to alternatives such as trusts, powers of 
attorney, health care advanced directives or powers or attorney/health care proxies, home 
health aides, or residential care facilities.  See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03(e).  Many 
of these alternatives are not realistic options because affordable health related services are not 
available because the individual wishes to remain in her home, or because the individual no 
longer has the recognized legal capacity to execute the relevant legal instruments.  PETRILA & 
SWANSON, supra note 35, at 34-35 (discussing the limited use of psychiatric advance 
directives) (citations omitted); Swanson et al., supra note 61, at 43, 55-56.  But see In re 
Guardianship of E.L., 911 A.2d 35, 39 (N.H. 2006) (discussing the court’s conclusion that 
neither health care power of attorney nor springing guardianship would be an appropriate less 
restrictive alternative to guardianship under the circumstances of that case). 
 73. See, e.g., In re Estate of Fallos, 898 N.E.2d 793, 799, 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).  
Although the appellate court did reverse the lower court’s decision refusing to terminate or 
limit the guardianship order, the decision likely reveals a common phenomenon at the lower 
court level.  See id. at 802.  In fact, in one 2007 study of guardianship orders in Colorado, a 
state which has adopted the UGPPA, the researcher found that while approximately one-third 
of the guardianship orders were technically “limited” orders, they  were actually “plenary 
orders with some specific limitations on the guardians’ powers added in.”  See Wright, 
Guardianship for Your Own Good, supra note 57, at 367 n.144. 
 74. See Lawrence A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform:  When the Best Is the Enemy of the 
Good, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 352-53 (1998) [hereinafter Frolik, Guardianship Reform]. 
 75. See Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and Use of Limited 
Guardianship, 31 STETSON L. REV. 735, 742 (2002) [hereinafter Frolik, Promoting Judicial 
Acceptance]. 
 76. See Salzman, supra note 1, at 175. 
 77. See Frolik, Guardianship Reform, supra note 74, at 354 (noting that “judges know all 
too well the financial costs of additional court appearances as guardians with insufficient 
authority to deal with the needs of their wards ask the courts to expand the limits of the 
guardianships.”).  See also Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance, supra note 75, at 743-44 
(2002) (noting that plenary guardianship saves the time of judges and litigants by removing 
the need to return to court to petition for expanded powers when the ward’s capacity 
declines). 
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those rare circumstances when the court enters a limited guardianship 
order, the person has been found to be incapacitated in at least some area 
of decision making, and as a result, may be treated as broadly 
incapacitated by individuals and entities within the community. 
Compounding these problems is the fact that guardianship orders rarely 
have a definite duration and generally continue until the ward’s death or 
order of the court.78  Additionally, the orders are often difficult to terminate 
for many of the same reasons that lead courts to enter overly broad 
guardianship orders in the first place.79 
With regard to the ward’s participation in decision making, state laws 
vary in the nature and amount of the guardian’s contact or consultation with 
the ward.  Many state laws now generally encourage the ward’s 
participation in decisions and encourage guardians to make decisions 
consistent with the ward’s desires and preferences, to the extent they are 
 
 78. See, e.g., UGPPA § 318(a).  While most states have a system for requiring the filing 
and monitoring of  guardian reports, there are serious deficiencies in guardianship monitoring 
practices.  See, e.g., Naomi Karp & Erica F. Wood, Guardianship Monitoring:  A National 
Survey of Court Practices, 37 STETSON L. REV. 143, 160-75, 184-92 (2007).  As a result, 
many guardian reports simply “fall through the cracks,” and few states mandate a periodic 
court review to determine the continued need for a guardian.  See MONITORING FOLLOWING 
GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 67 (indicating that only a small number of states have 
some requirement for affirmative court review of the need for continuation of the order, i.e., 
CAL. PROB. CODE § 1850(a)(1), (2) (West 2010) (requiring court investigator to periodically 
visit conservatee and report to the court, which may take action, including conducting a 
hearing to determine continued propriety of conservatorship); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-
660(c) (West 2010) (calling for periodic court review of the need for continued 
conservatorship); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3084(a), (b) (2010) (requiring court or designee to 
review the periodic guardian report and permitting the court to order a hearing to review any 
issue relating to the guardianship); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5309 (West 2010) (calling 
for unspecified court “review” of guardianship order at periodic intervals); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
475.082(1) (requiring annual court review for continuing need for guardianship with the 
review implemented based on guardian’s status report filed with the court); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 159.176 (West 2010) (requiring that every guardianship is subjected to an unspecified 
annual court “review”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(d) (West 2010) (providing for 
unspecified court “review” of guardian’s annual report, including any health care decision-
making authority); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.49(A)(2) (requiring review of guardian’s 
biennial report to determine the continued need for a guardianship)). 
 79. See, e.g., In re Estate of Fallos, 898 N.E.2d 793, 797-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (citing 
to trial court finding that the ward  continued to need a plenary guardian due to the risk 
presented by his “underestimating the severity of his physical limitations and overestimating his 
ability to live independently”); Wright, Guardianship for Your Own Good, supra note 57, at 
361.  But see, e.g., In re Penson, 735 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (affirming 
decision terminating guardianship based on individual’s understanding of his limitations and a 
demonstration that he was capable of managing his finances). 
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known.80  As a result of these guardianship reforms, and the philosophical 
principles that motivated these changes, some guardians do make those 
decisions they believe the ward would have made, some guardians may 
involve their ward in decisions, and some guardians may even allow the 
ward to make independent decisions in certain decision-making areas within 
the guardian’s authority.  Nevertheless, while some guardians may actively 
involve their wards in decisions about their lives, legally, the decisions are 
vested in the guardian and are the guardian’s to make.81  State laws do not 
provide an enforceable right for the ward to participate in decisions or to 
have his or her wishes followed.  While the ward or other interested person 
could petition the court to change or remove the current guardian, it is not 
clear that a court would remove a guardian for the sole reason that he or 
she was not encouraging the ward’s participation in decisions, in the 
absence of some other more concrete harm to the ward.82  While some 
states require that the guardian include in the annual guardianship reports 
the number of visits or contacts he or she has made with the ward,83 few, if 
any states, require that the guardian report on the nature of the contact or 
the extent of the ward’s involvement in decision making or any efforts by the 
guardian to help restore the ward’s “capacity.”84  Even if guardians were 
required to include this information in the annual reports, the change is 
unlikely to be particularly useful in the absence of improved state monitoring 
of guardianship reports. 
 
 80. See, e.g.,  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312(A)(7) (2008) (requiring guardians to 
“encourage” ward’s self-reliance and independence); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-314 (2008) 
(providing that guardian should “encourage the ward to participate in decisions”); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 45a-656(b) (2008) (stating that a conservator “shall afford the conserved person 
the opportunity to participate meaningfully in decision-making in accordance with the 
conserved person’s abilities and shall delegate to the conserved person reasonable 
responsibility for decisions affecting such conserved person’s well-being”).  See also UGPPA § 
314(a) (encouraging guardians to involve their wards in decision making “to the extent 
possible”). 
 81. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-314 
(2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-656(a) (2008). 
 82. See generally In re Estate of Fallos, 898 N.E.2d at 801 (observing that the burden is 
on the individual seeking to modify or terminate guardianship).  But see In re Guardianship of 
E.L., 911 A.2d 35, 38 (N.H. 2006) (noting that the guardian bears the burden in proceeding 
to terminate). 
 83. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.30(a), (c), 81.31(a) (setting forth the 
requirements for the initial and annual reports to be submitted by the guardian); UGPPA § 
317(a) (requiring guardians to report within thirty days of appointment and annually 
thereafter). 
 84. See MONITORING FOLLOWING GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 67 (setting 
forth the general contents of each state’s guardian’s report).  The UGPPA, however, provides 
model language for requiring that the annual report include a summary of the ward’s 
decision-making involvement.  UGPPA § 317(a)(4). 
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D. The Inadequacy of Guardianship to Address the Needs of Persons with 
Psychosocial Disability 
In addition to the general concerns about the guardianship system, there 
are reasons for particular concern about the imposition of guardianship for 
persons with psychosocial conditions, due to prevailing stereotypes and 
prejudices that disadvantage them in the guardianship adjudication process. 
Persons with psychosocial disabilities must overcome the significant stigma 
attached to psychosocial disability,85 the assumptions that they are inherently 
different and predisposed to violence,86 and notions that their “mental 
defect” precludes their ability to reason and make a whole range of 
personal decisions.87 
1. The Culture of Protection and Concerns about Relapse and Related 
Acts of Violence 
Because of judicial concerns about the episodic and recurring nature of 
psychosocial conditions, and a concern (or presumption) that a future 
relapse could result in an act of violence, courts may err on the side of 
caution when determining whether an individual with a psychosocial 
disability is “incapacitated” and in need of a guardian.88  Recent cases in 
New Hampshire and New York illustrate this phenomenon. 
In In re Guardianship of E.L.,89 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
affirmed a lower court decision refusing to terminate the ten-year 
guardianship of a man with bipolar disorder even though there had not 
been a single incident indicating “incapacity” within the two years prior to 
the request to terminate,90 and state law required evidence of the inability to 
 
 85. See PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 45, at 19-20 
(noting that because of the stigma surrounding psychosocial disability, many individuals who 
might benefit from treatment are reluctant to seek it). 
 86. Lawson, supra note 2, at 77 (citation omitted) (“People with psychosocial impairments 
are commonly regarded as unpredictable, irrational, slow, stupid, unreliable, not responsible 
for their actions, violent and dangerous.”). 
 87. See PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at 42-47 (describing the myths 
underlying the discourse about and treatment of persons with psychosocial disability).  See 
also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 610 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (referring to the 
“common phenomenon that a patient functions well with medication, yet, because of the 
mental illness itself, lacks the discipline or capacity to follow the regime the medication 
requires.”). 
 88. Thomas Grisso, Clinical Assessments for Legal Decisionmaking:  Research 
Recommendations, in LAW & MENTAL HEALTH:  MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 49, 
65-66 (Saleem Shah & Bruce Sales eds., 1991).  See, e.g., In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 482-
83, 487 (N.Y. 2004) (endorsing state intervention through assisted outpatient treatment order 
to prevent prospective relapse of individuals with psychosocial disability). 
 89. In re Guardianship of E.L., 911 A.2d 35 (N.H. 2006). 
 90. Id. at 37-38, 41, 43. 
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manage affairs within the prior six months for the initial appointment of the 
guardian.91  In reaching its decision, the Court expressed a concern that the 
ward would stop taking his medications and decompensate if the 
guardianship was terminated.92 
In a similar vein, in In re Ada (John D.),93 the court had to decide 
whether to appoint a guardian for Mr. D., in light of his prior psychiatric 
hospitalization with a subsequent episode of hypomania that resulted in 
“excessive and irrational spending,” and his doctor’s prediction that there 
was at least a thirty percent chance of a relapse in his condition.94  Despite 
the court’s specific determination that John D. was not incapacitated95—a 
finding that should have resulted in dismissal of the guardianship petition—
the court appointed a “monitor” to “oversee” John’s financial activities and 
medical treatment “in light of the possibility of relapse.”96 
Guardianship judges are not immune from the common presumption 
that individuals with severe psychosocial disability are prone to violence97 
and will engage in violent behavior without the oversight of their 
guardians.98  When there is doubt, judges and experts would rather be “safe 
than sorry.”99  Complicating matters is the fact that while there have been 
 
 91. Id. at 43. 
 92. Id. at 40-42. 
 93. In re Ada, 885 N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 94. Id. at 194-95. 
 95. Id. at 195. 
 96. Id. at 195-96.  See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.16(b) (authorizing a protective 
arrangement, but only if the AIP “is found to be incapacitated,” and only when it is necessary 
“as a means of providing for personal needs and/or property management for the alleged 
incapacitated person”) (emphasis added). 
 97. See PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 45, at 20 
(finding that sixty-one percent of Americans surveyed believe that people with schizophrenia 
are likely to be violent) (citing BERNICE A. PESCOSOLIDO ET AL., AMERICANS’ VIEWS OF MENTAL 
HEALTH AND ILLNESS AT CENTURY’S END:  CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 15, 16 (1996), available at 
http://www.indiana.edu/~icmhsr/docs/Americans’%20Views%20of%20Mental%20Health.pd 
f)); Henry A. Dlugacz, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment:  Some Thoughts on Promoting a 
Meaningful Dialogue Between Mental Health Advocates and Lawmakers, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 79, 85 (2008/2009) (noting that the perceived relationship between mental disability and 
violence is fueled by “[m]edia portrayals of the mentally ill, as well as the tragic nature of 
specific cases where a person with a mental disability kills or harms another person.”). 
 98. See Understanding Psychosocial Disability:  Factsheet, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.samhsa.gov/Mental 
Health/understanding_Mentalllness_Factsheet.aspx (last updated Sept. 24, 2008). 
 99. See generally Nicholas Scurich & Richard John, The Normative Threshold for 
Psychiatric Civil Commitment, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 425, 428 (2010) (discussing research finding 
that judges utilize a very low threshold of the probability of violence to authorize short-term 
civil commitment, with half of a sample of judges concluding that an eight percent chance of 
violence was sufficient, and some concluding that a one percent chance was sufficient). 
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some improvements in risk assessment techniques, experts have difficulty 
predicting future dangerous conduct with any reasonable degree of 
accuracy, and “between one-half and three-quarters of those identified as 
dangerous by psychiatric professionals do not, in the end, turn out to be 
violent.”100  The reality is that decisions about whether an individual with a 
psychosocial disability is likely to be a danger to self or others are 
“inherently subjective,”101 and when pressed, experts have had difficulty 
credibly explaining the basis for an opinion about future dangerousness.102 
2. Courts Underrate the “Capacity” of Persons with Psychosocial 
Conditions 
The validity of the court’s “capacity” determination may be undermined 
by at least three factors.103  First, pervasive stereotypes lead courts and other 
individuals involved in the guardianship assessment process to underrate the 
competencies and credibility of persons with psychosocial conditions.  
Second, the court may blur the distinction between the rationality of an 
individual’s decision and the individual’s actual ability to make a decision.  
Third, because of the difficulty of parsing out various decision-making 
 
 100. PETER BARTLETT & RALPH SANDLAND, MENTAL HEALTH LAW:  POLICY AND PRACTICE 147 
(Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2007); PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at 44 n.188 
(citations omitted).  See generally Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 322, 323-24 (1990) 
(“Manifestations of mental illness may be sudden, and past behavior may not be an adequate 
predictor of future actions.”); Adams v. Schwartz, No. CIV S-05-2237 JAM JFM P, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 85269, *34-35 n.10, *39 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008) (discussing the uncertainty in 
predicting future violent actions); Matter of M.M.B., No. 88-0984, 1988 WL 112479, at *2 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1988) (noting the difficulty of objectively evaluating evidence of future 
dangerousness of persons with psychosocial disability due to ingrained stereotypes regarding 
the relationship between psychosocial disability and violent behavior).  In fact, studies reveal 
only a very small correlation between severe psychosocial disability and violence, and show 
significantly higher correlations between drug use, socioeconomic status, or characteristics of 
the individual’s neighborhood and a person’s risk of violence.  See, e.g., PETRILA & SWANSON, 
supra note 35, at 29-30; PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 
45, at 20; Understanding Mental Illness:  Factsheet, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.samhsa.gov/MentalHealth/ 
understanding_Mentalllness_Factsheet.aspx (last updated Sept. 24, 2008). 
 101. PETRILA & SWANSON, supra note 35, at 10-11.  See John Petrila & Corine de Ruiter, 
The Competing Faces of Mental Health Law:  Recovery and Access Versus the Expanding Use 
of Preventive Confinement, AMSTERDAM L. FORUM, 2011, at 59, 63 (noting the difficulty of 
accurate risk assessment on an individual basis and the tendency in some cases for mental 
health experts to exaggerate the reliability and validity of risk assessment instruments). 
 102. See Grisso, supra note 88, at 65-66. 
 103. See generally Wright, Proposal for an Integrative Approach, supra note 33, at 79-82 
(discussing difficulties inherent in psychiatric diagnoses, assessments of “capacity,” and 
treatment decisions). 
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competencies, the guardianship court may make more global assessments 
of incapacity than are actually justified. 
Judges, like many others, are greatly influenced by oversimplified 
perceptions and “misinformed opinions” regarding psychosocial disability 
that cause people to “imply cause-and-effect relationships that do not 
exist,”104 and continue to equate psychosocial disability with legal 
incapacity.105  The equation of psychosocial disability with incapacity carries 
over to the court’s assessment of the credibility of the individual with the 
psychosocial condition. Courts have a tendency to discredit the person’s 
testimony regarding her own needs and abilities,106 increasing the burden 
on the individual with psychosocial disabilities to establish her ability to 
make decisions and manage affairs.107 
There is also the well-noted problem of guardianship courts making 
decisions about “capacity” based on the perceived rationality of the 
individual’s decision, rather than on the individual’s actual ability to make a 
decision, a problem that is particularly acute when the alleged incapacitated 
person has a psychosocial disability.108  A court’s reliance on the perceived 
irrationality of an individual’s decision in reaching a determination that the 
individual lacks capacity is all the more problematic because the court may 
discredit the individual’s stated preferences and assessment of her own well-
being if it does not conform to the court’s sense of what best serves the 
individual’s interests.109 
 
 104. See PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at 25. 
 105. See Minkowitz, U.N. Convention, supra note 24, at 408. 
 106. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 133 (1989) (questioning whether an 
individual with psychosocial disability could ever seek “voluntary” admission to a psychiatric 
facility, because the individual will not be able to understand the necessary information or 
knowingly consent to admission); PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at 173 (discussing 
the possible impact of Zinermon); Deirdre M. Smith, The Disordered and Discredited Plaintiff:  
Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Litigation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 788 (2010) (citation omitted) 
(noting that at common law “insanity” rendered an individual incompetent to provide 
testimony in a judicial proceeding). 
 107. See PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at 155-56; Terry Carney et al., 
Advocacy and Participation in Mental Health Cases:  Realisable Rights or Pipe-dreams?, 26 
LAW IN CONTEXT, no. 2, 2008, at 125, 133 (citations omitted) (referring to a 2005 study of  
proceedings before  the Australian mental health tribunal); Donnelly, supra note 58, at 47; 
Smith, supra note 106, at 804-05 (discussing judicial decisions that relied on or excluded 
psychiatric testimony regarding a witness’s psychosocial disability for purposes of evaluating 
credibility). 
 108. See Charles M. Culver, Health Care Ethics and Mental Health Law, in LAW & MENTAL 
HEALTH:  MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AND RESEARCH NEEDS, supra note 88. 
 109. Carney et al., supra note 107, at 131 (noting that an individual’s assessment of his or 
her own well-being must consider “the balance between current and future well-being; 
physical, psychiatric, social and psychological well-being; safety and autonomy”).  The 
rejection of an individual’s assessment of her own mental health and the suitability of various 
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The guardianship court’s conflation of the irrationality of a decision with 
the “incompetence or incapacity” of the decision maker is most obvious in 
the important area of health care decision making, especially when an 
individual is rejecting a recommended treatment.110  Such a decision is 
deemed to be irrational because the assumption is that the person is better 
off taking recommended medications.111  Because of the frequent 
assumption that individuals with psychosocial conditions would exercise their 
right to make medical decisions by rejecting necessary psychiatric 
treatment,112 and since judges and medical professionals view consistent 
treatment compliance as very beneficial—which it often is—courts may be 
willing to favor the imposition of a guardianship order as a remedy to 
ensure the individual’s continued treatment compliance, even if the 
individual’s condition has stabilized and the evidence does not support a 
finding of incapacity.113 
However, the assumption that the individual with psychosocial disability 
(who is not dangerous) should take medication for his or her own good, 
conflicts with the fundamental right accepted in other contexts to refuse 
 
treatment regimes is ironic.  It is precisely as a result of “the episodic nature of incapacity in 
severe mental illness” that the affected individual understands the course of the condition and 
the most effective means of managing it in the event of a future crisis.  PETRILA & SWANSON, 
supra note 35, at 23.  See Adina Halpern & George Szmukler, Psychiatric Advance Directives:  
Reconciling Autonomy and Non-Consensual Treatment, 21 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 323, 323-26 
(1997) (discussing the use of PADs for people with psychosocial conditions that may make 
them temporarily incapacitated and significant court decisions involving the determination of 
capacity); Aaron Levin, Psychiatrists Often Reluctant To Encourage PADs, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, 
July 15, 2005, at 17. (describing a study demonstrating that most individuals with 
psychosocial conditions had clear and insightful opinions about treatment and their 
conditions, and that most patients were willing to consent to treatment with at least one 
psychotropic drug and willing to go to at least one hospital in a crisis). 
 110. See Donnelly, supra note 58, at 46, 48-49 (citing to studies indicating that in the 
context of proceedings in the United States to determine whether an individual had “capacity” 
to refuse psychiatric treatment, most such patients were found to lack capacity). 
 111. See PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at 155-56. 
 112. Swanson et al., supra note 61, at 54.  Studies indicate that this assumption is 
incorrect.  See generally Levin, supra note 109 (observing that psychiatric advanced directives 
were not used to solidify future inappropriate treatment refusals, and rarely contained 
inappropriate treatment requests); Donnelly, supra note 58, at 50-51 (noting that participation 
in treatment decisions often results in patients consenting to medication other than that which 
was recommended by the treating psychiatrist, but ultimately leads to a resolution both can 
live with); Eric B. Elbogen et al., Clinical Decision-making and Views About Psychiatric Advance 
Directives, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 350, 351, 353 (2006). 
 113. “Judicial paternalism manifests itself either in the sense of wishing to see an individual 
do well, or as conservatism in judicial decision-making based upon a desire to avoid 
spectacular failures.”  Dlugacz, supra note 97, at 89 (observing that in the related context of 
renewals of outpatient commitment orders, consistent compliance with medical treatment is 
often viewed by the court as evidence that the order is “working” and should be extended). 
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medical treatment even when it is needed to save the person’s life or restore 
his or her health.114  In this context, the decision to remove the individual’s 
ability to make health care decisions, and to give the guardian the authority 
to consent to medical treatment, is implicitly or explicitly justified, ironically, 
as a means of restoring or maintaining the individual’s ability to function 
more autonomously.115  This is not to minimize the goal of appropriately 
treating persons with psychosocial disability.  Guardianship should not be 
imposed, however, when an individual is able to make a medical decision, 
but wishes to refuse a particular treatment.116 
The prevailing assumption that persons with psychosocial disability are 
not competent to make medical decisions is simply not justified.  The 
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study concluded that approximately 50% 
of the persons hospitalized for schizophrenia and 75% of the persons 
hospitalized for severe depression performed in the adequate range of 
decisional abilities—as good as those without psychosocial disability—and 
these percentages were higher when looking at a single component of the 
various decision-making competencies.117  So, even for medication decision 
 
 114. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 272-79 (1989) 
(reviewing state court decisions upholding the right of an individual to refuse medical 
treatment even when the refusal may cause the individual’s death and observing that Supreme 
Court precedent could support a “constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment . . . .”). 
 115. See Donnelly, supra note 58, at 43-44; EXPERT COMM., REVIEW OF THE MENTAL HEALTH 
ACT 1983, U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH ¶ 2.9 (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_ 
consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4062614.pdf.  
But see Petrila & de Ruiter, supra note 101, at 61 (citations omitted) (noting that “[w]hile the 
implementation of outpatient commitment . . . has [sometimes] been hampered by a lack of 
adequate treatment resources and cumbersome statutory procedures,” research has suggested 
that outpatient commitment for at least six months in conjunction with “adequate treatment” 
over that time period has reduced hospitalizations and criminal conduct “among some 
individuals with serious mental illnesses”); Tanya Wanchek & Richard J. Bonnie, Reducing 
Mental Health Civil Commitments through Longer Temporary Detention Periods, Va. Pub. L. & 
Legal Theory Res. Paper Series No. 2011-05, 4, 6-7, 9 (August 2010), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1766047 (analyzing state court data 
and Medicaid claims in Virginia and concluding that temporary involuntary treatment through 
Temporary Detention Orders can lower the frequency and length of involuntary civil 
commitments). 
 116. If the person is dangerous as a result of psychosocial disability, that person should be 
hospitalized.  If there is no actual safety issue, treatment should be voluntary in order to 
encourage “long term engagement in treatment.”  Where We Stand:  Outpatient and Civil 
Commitment, BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, http://www.bazelon.org/Where-We-
Stand/Self-Determination/Forced-Treatment/Outpatient-and-Civil-Commitment.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2011). 
 117. Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 50, at 171-72 (citing results of study assessing 
decision-making abilities across all decision-making measures and noting that, when 
examining performance on a single measure of decisional abilities, “the rate of performance 
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making, psychiatric patients are “not necessarily more incompetent than 
non-mentally ill persons to engage in independent medication decision 
making.”118  Further, in light of the well-recognized adverse side effects of 
anti-psychotic drugs, including “neuroleptic malignant syndrome and painful 
seizures,”119 in many cases the decision to reject certain medications might 
actually reflect a clear ability to understand the consequences of such 
treatment.  Rather than drawing conclusions about medical decision-making 
abilities from the individual’s acceptance or rejection of proposed 
treatment,120 techniques and tools, such as the MacArthur Competence 
Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T) should be used for assessing 
medical decision-making competencies in the guardianship context.121  
Grisso and Applebaum have helped demonstrate the complexity of 
evaluating “decision-making capacity” in the medical decision-making 
context.  They have demonstrated that the ability of persons with serious 
psychosocial disability to make health care decisions improved significantly 
 
rose to roughly 75% for patients with schizophrenia and to approximately 90% or more for 
patients with depression.”).  See WINICK, supra note 36, at 104-10 (2005) (discussing the 
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study). 
  Appelbaum and Grisso identified the competencies needed to make medical 
decisions as:  the ability to understand relevant information, the ability to appreciate the 
nature and significance of the decision, the ability to draw conclusions from the facts and 
evaluate potential consequences, and the ability to communicate choices.  PERLIN, HIDDEN 
PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at 93 (citing Paul Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients’ 
Capacities to Consent to Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1635-36 (1988)). 
 118. Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment Law:  
Kendra’s Law as Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 183, 194 (2003).  See also Barry 
Rosenfeld, Eric Turkheimer & William Gardner, Decision-making in a Schizophrenic 
Population, 16 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 651, 660 (1992) (controlling for differences in verbal 
functioning, the study revealed that persons with schizophrenia were able to weigh risks, 
benefits, and probabilities as well as nonpatients). 
 119. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S 471, 484 (1999).  See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 
U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 120. See Norman G. Poythress, Jr. & Robert D. Miller, The Treatment of Forensic Patients:  
Major Issues, in LAW & MENTAL HEALTH:  MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 81, 88-
89, supra note 88 (suggesting other ways of assessing an individual’s competency to consent 
to medical treatment). 
 121. See Thomas Grisso, Paul S. Appelbaum & Carolyn Hill-Fotouhi, The MacCAT-T:  A 
Clinical Tool to Assess Patients’ Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 48 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVS. 1415, 1418 (1997) (describing the MacCAT-T and its usefulness in determining 
patients’ capacities to make medical treatment decisions).  See generally Grisso, supra note 
88, at 70-71 (“In summary, research must first define what people are expected to know, 
understand, or do in the relevant area of functioning with which the legal standard for 
competence is concerned . . . descriptive research must document and categorize the types of 
functional abilities that various environments or decisionmaking circumstances require of 
people . . . [and then] require the examinee to demonstrate the specific functions in 
question.”). 
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when relevant information was presented incrementally and repeated to the 
patient. 122  It is not clear that guardianship courts are uniformly willing to 
invest the time and effort needed to engage in the difficult analysis of 
decision-making abilities with regard to the specific competencies involved 
in the range of decisions at issue in the guardianship proceeding.123 
3. Guardianship is not Adequately Responsive to Changes in the 
Individual’s Condition 
As noted supra, most guardianship orders are not time-limited and last 
until the ward’s death or a modification or termination of the order.124  
Psychosocial conditions are often temporary or episodic, and the individual 
may experience significant improvement in decision-making capabilities, or 
even full recovery, within a reasonably short time period.125  These 
fluctuations in condition are not sufficiently accounted for in either the initial 
decision to appoint a guardian or in the duration of the guardianship 
order.126  Because mental health conditions are subject to significant 
changes over time, often with long periods of stability, there is cause for 
concern about the accuracy and integrity of the capacity determination and 
the propriety of the guardianship order.  These concerns are particularly 
troubling in the context of a guardianship process in which the ability to 
modify or vacate the order is not so simple. 
The next question to be analyzed is how supported decision-making 
programs avoid these deleterious effects of guardianship on persons with 
psychosocial conditions and thus enable individuals with limitations in 
decision-making abilities to remain more fully integrated in life’s essential 
activities. 
 
 122. Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 50, at 172-73. 
 123. See, e.g., Submission from Tina Minkowitz, Center for the Human Rights of Users and 
Survivors of Psychiatry, to the Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Day of 
General Discussion on CRPD Article 12, available at http://www.chrusp.org/home/ 
publications [hereinafter Minkowitz, Discussion on CRPD Article 12]. 
 124. See UGPPA § 318(a); Wright, Proposal for an Integrative Approach, supra note 33, at 
71. 
 125. See Swanson et al., supra note 61, at 43-44.  See generally L.C. by Zimring v. 
Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 902-03 (11th Cir. 1998), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (noting general fluidity of psychiatric conditions). 
 126. See Weller, supra note 60, at 100.  See generally Minkowitz, Discussion on CRPD 
Article 12, supra note 123, pt. 1 (observing in the context of forced administration of 
medication that standards and protocols are needed for determining when immediate 
treatment is required for a serious mental health condition and when such treatment may be 
deferred in order to obtain the individual’s consent). 
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III.  SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING PROVIDES A VIABLE AND LESS RESTRICTIVE 
ALTERNATIVE TO GUARDIANSHIP 
A formal program of decision-making support substantially limits the 
deleterious and segregating effects of guardianship on persons with 
psychosocial conditions described in Part II (B).  Supported decision making 
moves beyond the theoretical “presumption of legal capacity” found in 
modern guardianship regimes, to provide each person with the legal right to 
make or participate in personal or financial decisions, and to receive the 
support that might be needed to do so.  Thus, rather than suffer a loss of 
decision-making rights, an individual with limitations in decision-making 
abilities can receive support to understand relevant information, issues, and 
available choices, to focus attention in making decisions, to help weigh 
options, to ensure that decisions are based on her own preferences, and, if 
necessary, to interpret and/or communicate her decisions to other parties.127 
While there is no singular supported decision-making model, scholars 
and commentators point to several characteristics of supported decision-
making programs.  First, the individual’s legal right to make decisions is not 
compromised by the appointment of a decision-making assistant or 
agent.128  Second, the individual freely enters into a support relationship and 
may terminate the relationship at any point in time.129 Third, the principal 
must actively participate in decision making pursuant to the appointed 
 
 127. See ANDREW BYRNES ET AL., FROM EXCLUSION TO EQUALITY:  REALIZING THE RIGHTS OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 89-91 (United Nations 2007).  See also OFF. OF THE PUB. 
ADVOCATE, SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING:  BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION PAPER 8-9 (2009), 
available at http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au/file/file/Research/Discussion/2009/Sup 
ported_Decision_Making_Nov09.pdf (noting that the hallmarks of supported-decision-making 
are choice, control, and responsibility). 
 128. See, e.g., Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 405, pt. 6, § 36 (1996), 
available at http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/R/96405_01.htm. 
 129. OFF. OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 127, at 23.  See Torbjorn Odlow, Swedish 
Guardianship Legislation–Progressive and Lagging Behind 1 (Nov. 14, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that in the Swedish system, the individual must consent 
to the appointment of a decision-making assistant); Swedish User-Run Service with Personal 
Ombud (PO) for Psychiatric Patients, PO-SKÅNE, http://www.po-skane.org/ombudsman-for-
psychiatric-patients-30.php [hereinafter PO-Skåne Description] (permitting the non-
bureaucratic and consensual appointment of decision-making assistant by the principal).  But 
see Herr, supra note 6, at 435-36 (discussing the Swedish assignment of an administrator or 
decision-making surrogate under certain circumstances where the individual does not consent 
to the appointment of a decision-making assistant); Odlow, supra, at 2-3 (noting that, in the 
event that establishment of a decision-making assistant is deemed inappropriate or insufficient 
due to the principal’s limitations, the court may appoint an administrator to oversee the 
principal’s daily activities). 
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powers.130  Fourth, decisions made with support are generally legally 
binding.131  In addition, and quite significantly, in those circumstances when 
a surrogate decision maker is appointed, the order of appointment is time-
limited and judicial consent is required to extend the order beyond its 
original duration.132 
So how is a formal, supported decision-making relationship created? 
There are two general types of models: the private supported decision-
making agreement and the court-appointed legal mentor or personal 
ombudsman (PO).133  In the relatively advanced, and apparently well-
received supported decision-making models being used in some Canadian 
provinces, an individual with disabilities has the right to enter into a private 
 
 130. See, e.g., Representation Agreement Act, pt. 3, §§ 16, 23 (1996) (creating a duty to 
consult the principal regarding his/her wishes “to the extent ‘reasonable’ and to carry out 
those wishes ‘if it is reasonable to do so;’” making the representative liable for actions taken 
without “reasonable” consultation with the principal and/or contrary to the principal’s 
“reasonable” wishes); Odlow, supra note 129, at 6-7 (noting that, in the Swedish system, the 
decision-making mentor/assistant cannot bind the individual with a disability to any 
transaction to which the individual had the capacity to consent but did not do so, and if the 
mentor acts without this consent, the mentor is liable to a third party for any resulting 
damages).  But see BYRNES ET AL., supra note 127, at 89-90 (concluding that, because the 
Swedish mentor is authorized to make independent decisions in certain circumstances, it 
seems more akin to a surrogate decision-making model). 
 131. See Representation Agreement Act, pt. 2, §§ 7, 9, 9.1; pt. 3, §§ 19, 24 (1996); 
Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, S.Y.T, ch. 21, pt. 1, § 11, pt. 2, § 25 
(2003).  In Canada, support and representation agreements can be entered into a central 
registry so that third parties are aware of their existence.  See, e.g., Nidus Personal Planning 
Resource Centre and Registry, NIDUS (July 2009), http://www.nidus.ca/PDFs/About%20us_ 
Nidus%20Fact%20Sheet_July2009.pdf. 
 132. See, e.g., Adult Guardianship Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 6, pt. 3, § 56(7), 57 (1996) 
(providing that an involuntary support and assistance plan imposed on an individual deemed 
incapable of acting to prevent his or her abuse or neglect lasts for no longer than six months 
and may only be renewed upon judicial order for a period of only six months); CRPD, supra 
note 4, art. 12(4); OFF. OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 127, at 24-25.  Compare UGPPA 
§ 301 (1997) (stating that guardianship continues until terminated) with UGPPA § 318 (1997) 
(stating that guardianship terminates upon a ward’s death or order of the court).  While 
UGPPA § 314(b)(5) requires the guardian to immediately notify the court if the ward regains 
all or partial “capacity,” and must also report on improvements in capacity in the annual 
report to be filed under § 317, a change in the guardianship order would only be effectuated 
by a petition to the court, or possibly the court’s sua sponte action to modify or terminate the 
petition based on a problem identified in the course of guardianship monitoring.  UGPPA §§ 
314(b)(5), 317 (1997).  Needless to say, this rarely (or never) occurs in reality. 
 133. Arguments exist for making the process for appointment of support more formal or 
less formal.  A less formal process may be more accessible and less stigmatizing, while a more 
formal process may provide greater protection of the individual’s substantive and procedural 
rights.  See Carney et al., supra note 107, at 137.  See also Salzman, supra note 1, at 235-
39 (providing a more detailed discussion of the particular programmatic elements in the two 
models). 
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legal agreement with one or more agents of his choosing who will provide 
assistance with decision making or act as formal decision-making 
representative(s) for the individual.134  The support or representation 
agreement, described as a “super power of attorney,” can give the agent 
broad powers to assist with decisions according to the instructions in the 
agreement and the individual’s known wishes and preferences,135 which will 
then be legally binding on third parties.136 
The support or representation agreement model differs from the 
traditional power of attorney in two significant ways.  First, these models 
seek to maximize the on-going and active involvement of the principal in the 
decision-making process.137  Second, at least in British Columbia, an 
individual who would not be deemed to have the generally accepted level of 
legal capacity to enter into a general or health care power of attorney could 
create a legally binding support agreement.138 
A second model, used in Sweden and other European nations, provides 
for judicial appointment of a legal mentor or PO to act as a decision-
making assistant for a person found incapable of making any or all 
 
 134. See Representation Agreement Act, pt. 1, § 2 (1996); Doug Surtees, The Evolution of 
Co-Decision-Making in Saskatchewan, 73 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 75, 84-91 (2010) (discussing 
co-decision-making program in Saskatchewan).  The Yukon model creates two legally distinct 
types of supported decision-making options, one of support and one of representation.  
Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act S.Y.T, ch. 21, pts. 1-2 (2003).  In 
general, these support personnel serve on an uncompensated basis.  For example, in the 
British Columbian system, the assistants are not paid for their services, unless such 
compensation is specifically directed in the agreement.  Representation Agreement Act, pt. 3, 
§ 26 (1996). 
 135. See, e.g., Representation Agreement Act, pt. 2, §§ 7, 9 (1996) (outlining the duties 
that the represented adult may assign to his/her representative). 
 136. See, e.g., Representation Agreement Act, pt. 3, §§ 19, 24 (1996).  In the absence of 
evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, or over-reaching, a decision made with 
or communicated by the support person or representatives must be legally recognized.  See, 
e.g., Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act S.Y.T, ch. 21, pt. 1, § 11, pt. 2, § 
25 (2003). 
 137. See, e.g., Representation Agreement Act, pt. 3, §§ 16, 23 (1996).  See generally 
Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden Abuses of Durable 
Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 46-50 (2006) (discussing the consultation 
requirement of the Canadian representation agreement and recommending changes to law 
and policy to involve the principal in decision-making pursuant to a durable power of 
attorney). 
 138. Compare Representation Agreement Act, pt. 2, §§ 7-8 (1996) (allowing adults to 
make a representation agreement though they are not capable of forming a contract or 
handling their own health care) with Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act 
S.Y.T, ch. 21, pt. 1, § 6 (2003) (permitting an adult to enter into a support agreement only if 
he or she understands the nature and effect of agreement).  See also Surtees, supra note 134, 
at 88-89; OFF. OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 127, at 24. 
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personal or financial decisions on her own.139  In at least one innovative 
Swedish PO program, an individual with severe psychosocial disability can 
appoint his or her own PO, with the PO accountable only to the individual 
who is receiving assistance.140 
Regardless of how they are structured or funded, however, supported 
decision-making programs are not without their own vulnerabilities. It is 
admittedly difficult to meaningfully assess whether an individual understands 
the risks, and can foresee the consequences of a potentially risky decision, 
and it is also difficult to assist another individual with decision making 
without inappropriately influencing her final decision.141  Consequently, 
supported decision-making programs must adopt adequate safeguards to 
ensure that the individual’s decision-making abilities are respected and that 
the individual receiving support is not harmed or exploited within, or as a 
result of, the support arrangement.  Various measures have been adopted in 
existing supported decision-making programs or have been recommended 
for adoption as programs evolve and new ones are created.142  These 
 
 139. See Föräldrabalk Svensk författningssamling [SFS] [hereinafter Code of Parents, 
Guardians, and Children] 1949:381 11 ch. 11, § 12, § 14, § 16, § 19 (Swed.); Herr, supra 
note 6, at 433-34; Odlow, supra note 129, at 1-2 (describing the “informal” judicial process 
for appointing a mentor/PO).  In the Swedish system, the decision-making assistants are paid 
from local or national government funds.  Herr, supra note 6, at 434; PO-Skåne Description, 
supra note 129. 
 140. See Maths Jesperson, PO-Skåne – Personal Ombudspersons in Skåne, available at 
http://www.peoplewho.org/documents/jesperson.decisionmaking.doc (last visited Apr. 10, 
2011) (noting that the program assists those “living entirely in a symbolic world of their own, 
living barricaded in their apartment or living homeless in the streets”); Minkowitz, U.N. 
Convention, supra note 24, at 409.  See generally PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON 
MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 45, at 35; OFF. OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 127, at 24-25 
(endorsing the option of a decision-making assistant, appointed by a tribunal, with the consent 
of the individual with the disability, who retains control of decisions and is responsible for 
them, while the support person must report to and is accountable to the appointing tribunal). 
 141. See OFF. OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 127, at 26.  Furthermore, empirical 
studies demonstrate the difficulty of accurately determining another person’s true preferences 
and wishes.  See Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Designating Health Care 
Decisionmakers for Patients Without Advance Directives:  A Psychological Critique, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 979, 996-1002 (2008). 
 142. For example, existing laws have created built-in safeguards such as requiring the 
designation of more than one decision-making representative to make certain personal and 
financial decisions and requiring that they act unanimously when making other than routine 
decisions.  See Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, pt. 2, §§ 15, 16, 21, 
23 (2003).  In addition, some models require the appointment of a monitor to oversee the 
actions of any agent assisting with financial arrangements.  See Representation Agreement 
Act, pt. 2, § 12 (1996); MICHAEL BACH, EQUAL RECOGNITION BEFORE THE LAW:  ARTICLE 12 
CRPD, slide 16 (2010), available at http://www.lebenshilfe.de/wDeutsch/ueber_uns/weltkon 
gress-2010/dokumentation/downloads/2010-06-16-Bach_-Michael.pdf [hereinafter BACH, 
EQUAL RECOGNITION] (calling for appointment of monitors for supported and surrogate 
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include the adoption of appropriate standards of conduct for and adequate 
training of support personnel, monitors, and those acting as surrogate 
decision-makers.143  In addition, administrative144 and judicial145 oversight 
and enforcement mechanisms must be available to address improprieties in 
the support arrangement.  The challenge is for supported decision-making 
programs to have adequate and appropriate safeguards without making the 
process so bureaucratic or complex that support mechanisms are not 
reasonably available to those who wish to use them.146 
This brief discussion reveals that supported decision-making models and 
the models contemplated by reformed guardianship laws rest on similar 
enunciated principles and share a number of goals and vulnerabilities.  
Reformed guardianship laws cite to the basic supported decision-making 
principle of the presumption of capacity, and to the supported decision-
 
decision making); Brayley, supra note 5, at 13.  As an additional safeguard, some 
recommend that the formal registration of the support arrangements include not only the 
names of the parties involved, but also the major legal transactions in which they participated, 
and the nature of support provided.  Minkowitz, Discussion on CRPD Article 12, supra note 
123, at pt. 5. 
 143. See, e.g., Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, pt. 1, §§ 7, 13, pt. 
2, §§ 16, 23 (2003) (setting out standards of care for support persons and representatives).  
See also BACH, EQUAL RECOGNITION, supra note 142, at slides 15, 16, 18; Brayley, supra 
note 5, at 2, 15; Minkowitz, Discussion on CRPD Article 12, supra note 123. 
 144. In order to ensure that the remedies for improper conduct within the support 
relationship are reasonably accessible to the person receiving support, as well as to others 
who observe intentional or unintentional impropriety in the agent’s actions, a number of 
models designate an administrative agency to investigate and hear complaints of improper 
conduct.  See, e.g., Representation Agreement Act, pt. 5, §§ 30-31 (1996) (providing that any 
person can report irregularities or potential undue influence or abuse to the Public Guardian 
and Trustee, who may conduct an investigation of the allegations).  See also OFF. OF THE PUB. 
ADVOCATE, supra note 127, at 25 (discussing several possibilities for oversight of the 
adequacy and propriety of support); BACH, EQUAL RECOGNITION, supra note 142, at slides 13-
15, 18 (advocating for a mandated authority to rule on the duty to provide appropriate 
supports, and to resolve any disputes between the supporting agents); Minkowitz, Discussion 
on CRPD Article 12, supra note 123 (providing that support networks are useful in the event 
that problems arise between the principal and advocate). 
 145. See, e.g., Representation Agreement Act, pt. 5, § 32 (1996) (permitting application 
for a court order to alter or revoke a representation agreement).  See generally Minkowitz, 
Discussion on CRPD Article 12, supra note 123 (observing that while judicial oversight is 
permitted under CRPD, Art. 12(4), it may not be needed except for situations of possible 
abuse or exploitation or other improper activity by the support personnel). 
 146. OFF. OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 127, at 27 (observing the inevitable tension 
between upholding the individual’s freedom to decide with support and implementing those 
measures that monitor the arrangement and hold the support persons accountable).  See, 
e.g., Minkowitz, Discussion on CRPD Article 12, supra note 123, at 4 (noting that the 
legitimate need for safeguards must be balanced with the need to ensure the availability and 
accessibility of support mechanisms). 
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making goals of limiting restrictions on the exercise of capacity, increasing 
the participation of the person with a disability in the decision-making 
process, and considering the values, wishes, and preferences of the 
individual with limitations in decision-making abilities, to the extent known.  
Further, every jurisdiction that has developed supported decision-making 
options still has an option for appointment of a guardian or some type of 
surrogate decision maker, when support is not deemed to be a viable 
option.147  In addition, the success of both supported decision making and 
guardianship programs depends in large part on the availability of trusted, 
trustworthy, willing, and capable individuals to serve as either support 
agents or guardians.148 
Despite these shared principles, goals, and potential limitations, 
however, there are significant differences between supported decision-
making models and the guardianship construct.  First, the prevailing 
guardianship system has little in the way of legally recognized options 
between autonomous and surrogate decision making.149  There are no 
mechanisms for allowing individuals with limitations in decision-making 
abilities to appoint their own decision-making agents and to have resulting 
decisions recognized legally.150  A formal program of decision-making 
 
 147. See, e.g., Surtees, supra note 134, at 84-87 (discussing Saskatchewan’s The Adult 
Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, which permits the appointment of either a 
guardian or a co-decision-maker).  In fact, in most jurisdictions, even those with formal 
supported decision-making programs, guardianship continues to be the predominant 
paradigm for providing assistance with decision making.  See, e.g., id. at 91-92 (noting that a 
review of 446 applications for appointment of a guardian or co-decision-maker filed in 
Saskatchewan during the period from 2001-2008 revealed that approximately ninety-three 
percent of the applications involved guardianship while only approximately seven percent of 
the applications involved co-decision-making). 
 148. See generally OFF. OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 127, at 22-24 (highlighting 
that support agents are unpaid volunteers drawn largely from family members of others with 
whom the individual has a trusting relationship).  Appropriate and committed persons may not 
always be available in the life of the person needing decision-making support or within the 
geographical location in which the individual resides.  The lack of suitable individuals to serve 
as guardians is often cited as a significant problem within the guardianship system.  See, e.g., 
Herr, supra note 6, at 434; BYRNES ET AL., supra note 127, at 91. 
 149. Existing laws in the United States do recognize that some individuals will exercise 
“capacity” with decision-making assistance, such as the use of “technological assistance” to 
make or communicate decisions, though such a person would not be deemed to be 
“incapacitated.,” and thus would be engaging in legally autonomous decision making   See, 
e.g., UGPPA, §102(5) (1997). 
 150. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of G.S., 953 A.2d 414, 419 (N.H. 2008) (concluding 
that “when an individual has limited insight into his mental illness and has impaired judgment 
regarding his need for medication, we have held that the individual ‘is not an appropriate 
candidate for a springing guardianship or a health care power of attorney’”) (citing In re 
Guardianship of E.L., 911 A.2d 35, 45 (N.H. 2006)). 
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support can fill the gap between the substituted decision making of 
guardianship and a purely informal system of support. 
Second, and related to the first distinction, while most guardianship laws 
provide that guardianship should only be imposed as a “last resort,” and 
require the court to see if there are existing alternatives that might assist the 
individual with personal affairs or property management, the existing 
available alternatives are often quite limited; guardianship laws simply do 
not require that all practicable decision-making support be given before a 
person is deemed to lack the legal capacity to make decisions and is 
divested of the right to make those decisions.151  In contrast, in the 
Canadian representation/support agreement model, for example, a 
guardian may be appointed to make decisions for the individual with 
disabilities, but only after “alternatives, such as the provision of support and 
assistance, have been tried or carefully considered.”152  If guardianship is to 
be a “last resort,” however, there must be an adequate “first resort.”153  
Formal decision-making support provides a significant option to call upon 
prior to the assignment of a surrogate decision maker and makes it more 
likely that guardianship will not be imposed unless there really are no other 
alternatives. 
Third, because a supported decision-making regime creates a right to 
support and the expectation that it will be provided whenever possible, the 
evaluation of “capacity” has a different purpose.  Decision-making abilities 
are not evaluated to determine if the state should intervene to remove an 
individual’s right to make decisions, but rather to determine the type of 
decision-making support that is needed by the individual.154  Thus, it is 
necessary to refine our understanding of the types of competencies required 
 
 151. Brayley, supra note 5, at 5 (advocating for adoption of the principle that “a person is 
not to be treated as unable to make a particular decision unless all practicable steps to help 
the person to do so have been taken without success”). 
 152. Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, Schedule A, § 2(d) (2003) 
(emphasis added).  See also Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, Schedule 
A, pt. 3, § 32(1)(c); Adult Guardianship Act, ch. 6, pt. 1, § 2(c) (1996).  In contrast, in the 
Swedish mentor model, the court will appoint a guardian-like administrator if the individual 
with impaired decision-making abilities objects to either the appointment of a mentor or to any 
decision made by the mentor, and the court determines that the individual’s interests would be 
“seriously jeopardized” without assistance.  See Herr, supra note 6, at 435-36.  The Swedish 
administrator resembles a limited guardian, though the ward does not lose his or her right to 
vote, as she might in some U.S. jurisdictions.   See, supra note 53. This mechanism for 
substituted decision-making in the mentor model undermines the principle of ensuring the 
principal’s consent to decisions, Odlow, supra note 129, at 8, and obviously may have a 
coercive impact even when a mentor is assisting with decision-making. 
 153. OFF. OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 127, at 3. 
 154. See MICHAEL BACH & LANA KERZNER, A NEW PARADIGM FOR PROTECTING AUTONOMY 
AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL CAPACITY 98-99 (2010). 
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in each particular area of functioning in order to assess the nature and 
amount of support needed by the individual to exercise his or her legal 
capacity as autonomously as possible.155  In addition, because of the right 
to exercise one’s own legal capacity and the fact that any restrictions on 
legal capacity are to be strictly time-limited and subject to regular, formal 
review,156 the role of an appointed surrogate decision maker within a 
supported decision-making jurisdiction carries with it an on-going duty to 
help restore the ward’s ability to exercise capacity, with supports if 
needed.157 
Because the guardianship system in the United States continues to rest 
on a false capacity-incapacity dichotomy, and fails to provide a meaningful 
option of decision-making support, true and complete reform may not be 
possible within the existing guardianship construct.  Other governments 
have adopted legislation allowing for the provision of formal decision-
making support as an alternative to the imposition of guardianship.  
Experiences with these support models demonstrate that they can meet the 
specific needs of individuals needing decision-making support, whether the 
individual needs intensive, ongoing support or only short-term support 
during a mental health crisis.  With the expectation of decision-making 
support and participation created by these models, it is likely that more time 
and effort will be spent providing an individual with the information needed 
to make decisions about his or her own life, a process that would be 
extremely beneficial to individuals with psychosocial conditions in a range of 
contexts, including the process for consent to medical treatment and the 
administration of psychotropic medication. 
 
 155. See BACH, EQUAL RECOGNITION, supra note 142, at slides 5-6. 
 156. See CRPD, supra note 4, art. 12(4).  See, e.g., Adult Guardianship Act, pt. 3, §§ 
56(7), 57 (1996).  Scholars and commentators criticize the lack of time limitations in the 
guardianship order and the lack of regular court review of the continuing need for 
guardianship.  See, e.g., Wright, Proposal for an Integrative Approach, supra note 33, at 88-
89; In the Matter of Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 431-32 (Sur. Ct. 2010) (finding that 
guardianship appointments under N.Y. MENT. HYG. LAW, art. 17-A, are not generally, but 
should be, subject to periodic reporting and review). 
 157. BACH & KERZNER, supra note 154, at 92 (observing the duty imposed on a surrogate 
decision maker by the CRPD to provide the support needed to maximize legal capacity).  
Michael Bach refers to this surrogate decision maker as a “facilitator” so as to continue to 
maintain the focus on the individual with the disability and to reinforce the notion that the 
appointment lasts for only so long as no one can determine anything about an individual’s 
desires.  BACH, EQUAL RECOGNITION, supra note 142, at slide 10.  See generally Wright, 
Guardianship for Your Own Good, supra note 57, at 354 (“Who is more likely to achieve the 
best substituted judgment, the incapacitated ward, who generally has some direct access, 
albeit limited by the degree of incapacity, to his/her own history of values and decisions, or 
the appointed guardian, who has full judgment capacity, but at best only a limited and 
indirect knowledge of the elder’s rich history of experience?”). 
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While the existing models of support are not yet perfect, as legal 
structures they create a right to support and participation in decision 
making.  The direct consequence is that rather than exclude persons with 
psychosocial disabilities from the decision-making process, the model of 
support enables them to more fully participate in the range of life’s activities, 
increasing opportunities for interactions with non-disabled individuals. 
IV.  THE ADA ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK SUPPORTS A CLAIM THAT GUARDIANSHIP 
VIOLATES TITLE II’S INTEGRATION MANDATE 
Elsewhere I have endeavored to argue that Title II of the ADA and the 
integration mandate support the recognition of a legal right to decision-
making support as a less restrictive alternative to guardianship.158  While the 
legal argument is not without its analytic difficulties, a push for decision-
making support is certainly consistent with the intent of the ADA and much 
of its jurisprudence. Olmstead and the ADA’s integration mandate provide a 
legal framework for thinking about a right to decision-making support as an 
alternative for guardianship.  This part will briefly explain why we should, 
and possibly can, extend the ADA’s non-discrimination principles to the 
decision-making arena and conceptualize guardianship as a form of 
prohibited disability-related discrimination. 
A. The Prima Facie Discrimination Claim under Title II of the ADA 
As noted above, in Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court concluded that 
the unjustified isolation of persons with disabilities in institutions subjects 
them to unwarranted stereotypes and diminishes their opportunity to engage 
in important aspects of communal life in violation of the ADA’s proscription 
against disability-based discrimination and the integration mandate.159  The 
argument here is that by removing the individual’s right to make decisions, 
guardianship not only perpetuates stereotypes that wards are incapable or 
unworthy of participating in community life, but because of the constructive 
isolation of guardianship,160 also diminishes the ward’s opportunities to 
participate in the host of every day social, economic, civic, and cultural 
activities cited by the Olmstead court.161 
In order to state a prima facie claim that guardianship imposes a form 
of segregation that violates the ADA, it will be necessary to establish that: 1) 
 
 158. For a more elaborate articulation of that argument, see Salzman, supra note 1, at 
182-231. 
 159. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597, 607 (1999).  See 
generally 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2010); 28 C.F.R. § 
35.130(b)(vii) (2010). 
 160. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 161. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601. 
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an individual with diminished mental capabilities for whom a guardian has 
been appointed or who is at risk of losing her right to make decisions is a 
“qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA; 2) guardianship is a 
public “service, program, or activity” within the meaning of the Act; and 3) 
guardianship constitutes a form of disability-based discrimination by a 
public entity.162  If the provision of guardianship rather than supported 
decision making might constitute a prima facie claim of disability 
discrimination, it will still be necessary to determine if a state could be 
required to provide supported decision-making options to avoid this 
discrimination.163 
1. An Individual Needing Assistance with Decision Making is a 
“Qualified Individual With a Disability” 
An individual challenging an existing or proposed guardianship, or the 
state’s failure to provide services to assist with decision making in order to 
avoid appointment of a guardian, should be able to establish that he or she 
is a “qualified individual with a disability” within the meaning of the ADA.164  
Individuals with diminished mental abilities needing decision-making 
assistance would meet the definition of “individuals with disabilities”165 
based on the showing that they are “substantially limited” in the ability to 
perform a recognized “major life activity,” such as caring for oneself, 
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, or communicating.166  
Consequently, individuals with psychosocial disabilities who need some 
 
 162. See, e.g., Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 12132). 
 163. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 164. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2006). 
 165. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006) (defining an individual with a disability as a 
person with “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major 
life activities of such individual.”). 
 166. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 
3555 (2008) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102) (providing a nonexclusive list of “major 
life activities”).  Although taking care of finances is not specifically noted in the list, a person 
who is unable to manage her finances would likely be deemed to be restricted in one of the 
“major life activities,” such as “caring for oneself,” “thinking,” or “concentrating.”  § 4(a), 122 
Stat. at 3555.  In addition, utilizing an interpretation of the “substantially limits” component of 
the disability definition that is consistent with the comprehensive remedial purpose of the ADA, 
these individuals should be deemed to be “substantially limited” in their abilities to perform at 
least one of these major life activities.  See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2010); ADA Amendments Act 
§§ 2(a)(8), 2(b)(1), 4(a)(4)(A)–(B), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554-55; § 4(a)(4)(C)–(E), 122 Stat. at 
3556 (noting that an impairment may substantially limit a major life activity even if the 
individual is not impaired in other major life activities, even if the impairment is episodic, 
though disabling when active, and even if mitigating measures can ameliorate the condition’s 
impairing effects). 
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assistance with decision making to adequately manage their personal or 
property affairs would be “individuals with disabilities” within the meaning of 
the ADA. 
It will be somewhat more challenging to demonstrate that an individual 
with diminished decision-making abilities is a “qualified individual with a 
disability,” i.e., one who “with or without reasonable modifications . . . 
meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the 
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.”167  While 
courts have liberally interpreted the standard for demonstrating that one 
“meets the essential eligibility requirements” of the program or service at 
issue,168 some work may be needed to establish that an individual is 
“qualified” for decision-making support outside of the guardianship 
construct. 
This is true for two reasons.  First, many decision makers are unfamiliar 
with the “requirements” of supported decision-making programs.169  Thus, it 
will be necessary to conduct further research in order to demonstrate that a 
broad range of individuals with psychosocial disabilities are able to 
participate in decision making with appropriate support.  This effort would 
be similar to that needed in connection with deinstitutionalization to 
demonstrate that individuals with significant disabilities could live outside 
institutions if they had adequate support in the community.170  Second, is the 
related problem that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead, 
courts are permitted to rely on the professional judgment of state 
professionals in determining whether a person with a disability is “qualified” 
to receive services in a less restrictive setting,171 and state professionals 
 
 167. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2006). 
 168. See, e.g., McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1264-70 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(finding man with AIDS needing additional time to clean his yard to comply with the city’s 
nuisance abatement law was a “qualified individual with a disability”); Williams v. 
Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591, 629-30 (D. Md. 2001) (noting that in 
deinstitutionalization litigation, plaintiffs were “qualified individuals with disabilities” despite 
the lack of existing community placements that could meet their needs).   See 28 C.F.R. pt. 
35, app. A, subpart A, § 35.104 (2008) (noting that “essential eligibility requirements” can be 
quite minimal). 
 169. See generally OFF. OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 127, at 8 (“Supported 
decision-making is presently quite loosely defined and articulated and there is very little 
material in literature or policy to draw upon.”). 
 170. The debate continues with regard to individuals with disabilities residing outside of 
institutions with appropriate support.  See generally Long v. Benson, No. 4:08cv26-RH/WCS, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109917, at *2-3 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2008), aff’d, 383 F. App’x 930 
(11th Cir. 2010). 
 171. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587, 189, 593-94, 602–
03 (1999).  Needless to say, this aspect of the Olmstead decision has been the subject of 
critical commentary.  See generally Michael L. Perlin, “Their Promises of Paradise”:  Will 
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assessing “capacity” in the guardianship context could be particularly 
resistant to the concept of supported decision making. 
In integration mandate cases decided after Olmstead, many courts have 
liberally construed the “qualified individual with a disability” standard to find 
that plaintiffs have met the “essential eligibility requirements” of the service, 
program, or activity in question.172  In cases where an individual’s eligibility 
for integrated services has been at issue, some courts have permitted the 
plaintiff to submit evidence of suitability from a treating or independent 
professional.173  In the guardianship context, plaintiffs’ lawyers and 
consumer advocates will need to identify psychiatrists and psychologists who 
understand the nuances of capacity and the ability of most individuals to 
participate in decision making with appropriate support, and to further 
educate other professionals on these realities.  There are of course, certain 
circumstances where a person with diminished decision-making abilities 
would be so severely impaired that he or she could not meaningfully 
participate in any decision making, even with assistance.  But in many, if not 
most cases, individuals with impairments affecting decision-making abilities 
would be able to participate in the decision-making process with 
appropriate assistance.  By utilizing evidence regarding the ability of most 
individuals to make decisions with appropriate support, and educating the 
relevant decision makers, it will be possible to demonstrate that most 
individuals seeking decision-making support would meet the ADA’s relatively 
liberal standard for “qualified individuals with disabilities.” 
 
Olmstead v. L.C. Restrict the Constitutional “Least Restrictive Alternative” Principle in Mental 
Disability Law?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 999, 1140–41 (2000); Eric Rosenthal & Arlene Kanter, The 
Right to Community Integration for People with Disabilities Under United States and 
International Law, in DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY:  INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 309, 320–21, 320 n.46 (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee eds., 2002). 
 172. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005); Townsend v. 
Quasim, 328 F.3d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 2003); Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 
383 F.3d 599, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2004); Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 
1181 n.7 (10th Cir. 2003).  See generally Salzman, supra note 1, at 200 n.144. 
 173. See authorities cited in Salzman, supra note 1, at 200 n.145.  See, e.g., Joseph S. v. 
Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280, 290–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940, 
972 n.25 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 540 
(E.D. Pa. 2001); Kathleen S. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460, 474 (E.D. Pa. 
1998).  See also Knowles v. Horn, No. 3:08-CV-1492-K, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11901, at 
*10-11 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (following recommendations of Plaintiff’s treating physicians over 
those of the State’s treatment professionals).  Compare  Boyd v. Steckel, No. 2:10-cv-688-
MEF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120802 , at *32-33 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (finding that, in the 
absence of conflicting medical evidence, it was appropriate for the State to rely on the opinion 
of the Medical Director and Deputy Commissioner of Health Systems for the Alabama 
Medicaid Agency that Plaintiff may not qualify for community-based services). 
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2. Guardianship is a Public “Service, Program, or Activity” Within the 
Meaning of the ADA 
The relevant case law makes clear that Title II’s prohibition of 
discrimination in public “services, programs or activities” was intended to 
address a broad range of governmental activities and courts have not been 
willing to carve out “‘spheres in which public entities may discriminate on 
the basis of an individual’s disability.’”174  The numerous decisions applying 
Title II to a wide range of public activities provide appropriate analogues for 
the application of Title II to the guardianship context.175 
To determine whether guardianship is properly deemed a public 
program, activity, or service, it is necessary to consider what guardianship is.  
Guardianship laws create a legal construct for appointing a surrogate 
decision-maker when an individual is deemed unable to make decisions 
sufficient to care for his or her needs.  The court assesses “incapacity,” 
appoints the guardian, and monitors the fiduciary relationship.  In public 
guardianship programs, the state funds, and may also provide, the 
guardianship services.176  In private guardianships, the state is not generally 
involved in the actual provision of the guardianship services.  Although a 
public guardianship is more obviously a public program, service or activity 
than is a private guardianship, there is authority to support the conclusion 
that both types of guardianships fall within the ADA definition of a public 
“program, service or activity.”177 
 
 174. McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1268–69 (9th Cir. 2004) [citations 
omitted] .  See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, subpart A §35.102 (2010) (noting “title II applies to 
anything a public entity does”); 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(j) (2010) (defining “[b]enefit” to include 
the “provision of services, financial aid or disposition (i.e., treatment, handling, decision, 
sentencing, confinement, or other prescription of conduct)”). 
 175. This author has been unable to locate any decisions specifically addressing the 
question of whether guardianship constitutes a public “service, program or activity” under the 
ADA.  Some ADA cases have challenged state laws placing limitations on the rights of 
individuals under guardianship, such as those rendering persons under guardianship unable 
to vote or marry, and in those cases the relevant state program or activity has been deemed to 
be that of voting, marrying, etc.  See, e.g., Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Carnahan, 499 
F.3d 803, 812 (8th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 58–59 (D. Me. 2001). 
 176. Forty-eight states have some type of public guardianship program.  See Pamela B. 
Teaster et al., supra note 72, at 201, 215-16. 
 177. Some have suggested that the guardianship context should be analogized to the 
context of the termination of parental rights in which a number of state courts have concluded 
that the ADA was inapplicable to these proceedings.  But the analogy is flawed and the case 
law is mixed, at best.  First, there are state courts that have concluded that a termination of 
parental rights proceeding may be a public “service, program, or activity” within the meaning 
of the ADA.  See In re Doe, 60 P.3d 285, 292-93 (Haw. 2002).  The court in In re Doe 
reviewed much of the relevant case law and concluded that some courts have concluded that 
the proceeding to terminate parental rights may be a “service, program, or activity” under the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] GUARDIANSHIP FOR PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 319 
Guardianships, whether public or private, can be characterized as 
either: 1) the government’s program, activity, or service for assisting those 
citizens who are incapable of managing their affairs due to limitations in 
decision-making ability; 2) the government’s program or activity regulating 
when a citizen can or cannot make legal decisions for him- or herself or the 
government’s deliberative process for determining the same; or 3) as a 
“statutorily created” assignment of decision-making rights to a guardian that 
is then “recognized and followed” by third parties.  Courts have found that a 
range of analogous governmental activities are subject to Title II, including 
for example, zoning laws,178 local code enforcement activities,179 the state’s 
mental health services program administered in private, adult homes,180 the 
substantive decision-making process of parole proceedings,181 or the state’s 
involuntary commitment or assisted outpatient treatment laws or 
processes.182  In addition, one case permitted a Title II challenge to a state’s 
health care power of attorney law, where the “program, activity, or service” 
was characterized as the “statutorily created opportunity to execute a 
[durable power of attorney] for health care and the right to have it 
 
ADA, some courts have concluded that it is not, and some courts have skirted the issue by 
simply finding that, under the circumstances of the particular case, the state agency had 
fulfilled any obligations potentially imposed by the ADA.  Id. at 290-91.  Cases that have 
concluded that a proceeding to terminate parental rights was not a “service, program, or 
activity” within the definition of the ADA for purposes of asserting a defense to the termination 
process on behalf of a disabled parent appear to reflect the view of those courts that 
“dependency proceedings are held for the benefit of the child, not the parent.”  M.C. v. Dep’t 
of Children and Families, 750 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).  See generally In 
re Gabriel Truitt & James Truitt, 2009 LEXIS 879, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (suggesting 
that ADA requirements may apply in this context when the state is providing reunification 
services). 
 178. See, e.g., Wis. Cmty. Servs. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 750 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(en banc) (noting that municipal zoning is a “program” or “service,” and enforcement of 
zoning rules is an “activity” within the meaning of the ADA); Innovative Health Sys. v. City of 
White Plains, 117 F.3d. 37, 44–45 (2nd Cir. 1997) (same). 
 179. McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1268–70 (9th Cir. 2004) (a city 
nuisance abatement law and related code enforcement activity qualified as “a benefit of the 
services, programs, or activities of a public entity”). 
 180. See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 316-17 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 181. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896–99 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 182. See Mental Disability Law Clinic v. Hogan, No. CV-06-6320 (CPS)(JO), 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 70684, at *50-51, *54 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (without directly addressing the issue, 
finding that plaintiffs stated a claim under the ADA’s integration mandate challenging 
eligibility criteria of the state’s assisted outpatient treatment law that resulted in their 
unnecessary commitment and institutionalization). 
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recognized and followed.”183  Thus, there is a basis for arguing that 
guardianship constitutes a “service, program, or activity” of a public entity 
within the meaning of the ADA. 
3. Providing Decision-Making Assistance Through Guardianship May 
Constitute Disability-Based Discrimination Under the ADA’s 
Integration Mandate 
The next element to consider is whether the appointment of a guardian 
rather than the provision of decision-making support might violate the 
integration mandate in some range of cases.184  The argument is that the 
integration mandate is properly applied outside of the institutionalization 
context, that guardianship is unnecessarily isolating, and that the request for 
decision-making support should not be seen as a request for a “new 
service” beyond the ADA’s reach, but simply as a request that the decision-
making assistance provided through guardianship be provided in a less 
restrictive manner. 
a. Olmstead’s Disability Discrimination Holding Applies Beyond the 
Context of Physical Isolation in an Institution 
Olmstead’s holding, which clearly addressed the isolation of individuals 
segregated in physical institutions,185 has been applied to claims brought by 
individuals living in the community seeking the creation or expansion of 
community-based services in order to continue living in that integrated 
setting.186  Admittedly, the bulk of these cases tie the finding of 
 
 183. See Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27, 38 (2nd Cir. 2003) (quoting Hargrave v. 
Vermont, No. 2:99-CV-128, at 23 (D. Vt. Oct. 11, 2001)) (emphasis omitted).  But see 
Salzman, supra note 1, at 203-04 n.155 (discussing the Hargrave court’s dicta questioning 
whether the ADA can be used to challenge a state civil commitment program or the 
procedures of the state durable power of attorney override law). 
 184. Salzman, supra note 1, at 206-09. 
 185. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). 
 186. See, e.g., Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 610-11 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (challenging the denial of continuous Medicaid private duty nursing services in the 
community); Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 
2003) (challenging the Medicaid limitation on prescription drug coverage under community-
based waiver program); Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(challenging the denial of Medicaid long-term care in the community); Cota v. Maxwell-Jolly, 
688 F. Supp. 2d 980, 993-95 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (challenging state modifications of eligibility 
criteria for Medicaid Adult Day Care Services); Knowles v. Horn, No. 3:08-CV-1492-K, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11901, at *8-15 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2010) (challenging the denial of 
necessary round-the-clock home health care);  Marlo M. ex rel. Parris v. Cansler, 679 F. 
Supp. 2d 635, 637-38 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (challenging the discontinuance of twenty-four-hour 
care and supervision at home); Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 
187, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (challenging the provision of mental health services in “community-
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discrimination to the fact that the individual would be at some risk of 
institutionalization if the requested community-based services were not 
provided.187  But many of these cases, while speaking to the risk of 
institutionalization resulting from a challenged practice or service denial, rest 
their decisions on the ADA’s preference for the most integrated services, 
programs and activities to enable those with disabilities to interact with non-
disabled persons and participate in community life to the fullest extent 
possible.188  In light of this compelling and relatively broad rationale, the 
cases support the application of the integration mandate beyond those 
contexts in which confinement in an institution is an actual or potential result 
of the challenged state program, activity, or service.  Rather, these cases 
give substance to the language and purpose of the integration mandate to 
maximize the interactions between individuals with disabilities and those 
without disabilities.  In this way, these decisions support the application of 
the integration mandate to redress the court-ordered constructive isolation 
of guardianship. 
 
based” adult homes rather than in more integrated settings).  But cf. Buchanan v. Maine, 469 
F.3d 158, 173 (1st Cir. 2006); Putz v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-00344 CW., 2010 WL 
1838717, *7-8 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2010). 
 187. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Radeszewski, 383 F.3d at 600; Fisher, 335 F.3d at 1177-78; Townsend, 328 F.3d at 515; 
Cota, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 987; Marlo, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 637; Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 
187; Putz, 2010 WL 1838717 at *3, *7-8 (dismissing ADA integration mandate challenge to 
law affecting personal care services where individuals were unable to demonstrate any actual 
threat of institutionalization in the initial period after the law’s implementation); Ball v. 
Rodgers, No. CV 00-67-TUC-EHC, 2009 WL 1395423, *5 (D. Ariz. April 24, 2009). 
 188. See, e.g., Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 618 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Fisher, 335 F.3d at 1181; Townsend, 328 F.3d at 517-18; Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 
187; Cruz v. Dudek, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118520, *30-31 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2010) 
(granting preliminary injunction to plaintiffs based on the claim that state’s denial of in-home 
long term Medicaid services unless the individual is institutionalized for sixty days violates the 
ADA’s integration mandate claim); id. at *35-39 (citing cases); Susan Stefan, Beyond 
Residential Segregation:  The Application of Olmstead to Segregated Employment Settings, 26 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 875, 917-24 (2010) (arguing that Olmstead and subsequent case law 
support the application of the integration mandate outside the traditional institutional context 
and may prohibit the unjustified isolation of people with disabilities in segregated sheltered 
workshops when those people would benefit from more integrated, supported employment 
services). 
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b. Supported Decision Making Is Not a “New Service” But Rather One 
That Provides the Decision-Making Assistance of Guardianship in a 
Less Restrictive Manner 
As a result of dicta contained in a footnote in Olmstead,189 courts 
analyzing a range of Title II claims have considered whether the plaintiffs 
were raising claims relating to an “existing public service” or were seeking 
the creation of a “new service,” which would not be required under the ADA 
or Olmstead.190  This analysis may appear in a Title II decision either as part 
of the court’s consideration of the plaintiff’s prima facie claim of 
discrimination or may be part of the court’s consideration of the 
fundamental alteration defense.  Thus, in order to state a prima facie claim 
under Title II or to overcome a fundamental alteration defense, it may be 
necessary to establish that a request for supported decision-making 
assistance in lieu of guardianship should properly be viewed as a request for 
the provision of existing services in a more integrated manner rather than as 
a request that the state create “new services or benefits.”191 
The decisions applying the “new services” limitation in Title II integration 
mandate cases appear to be in the minority.192  Several appellate courts 
have rejected the “new services” defense in the integration mandate context.  
In these cases, rather than looking at whether the state currently provided 
the precise community-based or integrated services requested by plaintiffs, 
the courts considered whether the plaintiffs were seeking services that were 
essentially the more integrated form of services that the state would provide 
 
 189. The Court mentioned in dicta that the ADA prohibited states from discriminating with 
regard to services that the state actually “provides,” but did not require them to “provide a 
certain level of benefits to individuals with disabilities.”  Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603 n.14 
(writing in response to Justice Thomas’s reference to Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 
(1985), in his dissenting opinion).  Although the applicability of the Choate limitation to ADA 
cases generally, or to integration mandate claims specifically, can legitimately be questioned, 
see Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate:  “Meaningful 
Access” to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 451 (2008), 
lower courts addressing ADA integration mandate claims continue to cite to this Olmstead 
footnote (i.e., Choate) language, see, e.g., Townsend, 328 F.3d at 518. 
 190. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 619 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that New York’s Medicaid personal care program was not required to provide 
services needed to monitor the safety of persons with mental impairments living in the 
community, as the program did not provide “safety monitoring” to anyone). 
 191. See Salzman, supra note 1, at 210-20, 220 n.200, for a more detailed discussion. 
 192. The Rodriguez type of “existing services” limitation is more appropriate (if at all) in a 
disparate treatment challenge, or even possibly one seeking a reasonable accommodation in 
order to access services, than it is in the context of an integration mandate challenge.  See, 
e.g., Mental Disability Law Clinic v. Hogan, No. CV-06-6320 (CPS)(JO), 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 70684, at *21, *52-53 (EDNY Aug. 26, 2008); Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 
280, 292 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  See also Salzman, supra note 1, at 211-12 n.173. 
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to them in a more restrictive setting.193  One court observed that some 
services provided in a restrictive setting might need to be adapted for the 
less restrictive setting.194  “If variations in the [precise form of services or the] 
way services are delivered in different settings were enough to defeat a 
demand for more community-integrated care, then the integration mandate 
of the ADA . . . would mean very little.”195  The integration mandate would 
be quite limited, if not relatively meaningless, if it only required the public 
entity to provide a Title II plaintiff with those precise services the entity had 
already chosen to provide.196  Consistent with the broad remedial purpose 
of the ADA, these decisions provide an analytical basis for arguing that 
supported decision making should be viewed as a less restrictive form of the 
personal and property management assistance currently provided within the 
guardianship construct. 
In addition, there are existing community-based programs that provide 
assistance with decision making that could be modified and/or expanded to 
provide less restrictive alternatives to guardianship for persons with 
psychosocial disability.  As one commentator has observed: 
 
 193. See, e.g., Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 609-11 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (finding that the request for home-based twenty-four-hour private duty nursing care 
not available under the state’s Medicaid program should be viewed as a request for a more 
integrated form of the constant monitoring and skilled assistance provided in an institutional 
setting); Townsend, 328 F.3d at 516-18 (viewing the community-based services sought by 
plaintiffs as “long-term medical care services” provided under the Medicaid program rather 
than as “new” community-based services for medically needy individuals); Fisher v. Okla. 
Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1178, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that a request 
for unlimited drug coverage not available under a Medicaid community-based waiver 
program should be viewed as a request for a more integrated version of the unlimited drug 
coverage provided by Medicaid in an institutional setting).  See also Knowles v. Horn, No. 
3:08-CV-1492-K, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11901, at *8-15 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2010); Marlo 
M. ex rel. Parris v. Cansler, 679 F. Supp. 2d 635, 638 (E.D.N.C. 2010); Salzman, supra note 
1, at 212-15 (providing a more detailed analysis of these decisions).  But see Conn. Office of 
Prot. & Advocacy v. Connecticut, 706 F. Supp. 2d 266, 276-78 (D. Conn. 2010) (following 
the Rodriguez reasoning in integration mandate challenge). 
 194. Radaszewski, 383 F.3d at 610-11. 
 195. Id. at 611.  The state would still have the opportunity to demonstrate that adapting 
existing institution-based services to the community setting would “fundamentally alter” the 
state’s program.  Id. at 611-12. 
 196. States have had to create new services in order to comply with the integration 
mandate.  See, e.g., Andy Miller, Justice Dept. Pushes for Services to Move Patients out of 
Mental Hospitals, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, Oct. 21, 2010, http://www.kaiserhealthnews. 
org/Stories/2010/October/21/Georgia-mental-health-settlement.aspx (describing a 
comprehensive agreement between the State of Georgia and the Civil Rights Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice that requires Georgia to commit the use of significant state funds 
to meet targets for increasing the availability of housing and community treatment options for 
individuals with mental disabilities, including community support teams and crisis intervention 
teams). 
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Application of this support model to the needs of persons with psychosocial 
disabilities will require innovation and should draw on existing programs 
that may not have been understood as support in the exercise of legal 
capacity.  Peer support, recovery-based services, community support 
networks, and personal assistance may all help people with psychosocial 
disabilities in ways related to decision-making or the exercise of legal 
capacity.197 
For example, existing community based programs include assertive 
community treatment,198 intentional peer support,199 intensive case 
management,200 and protective counseling.201  These types of community-
based support services could be expanded or modified to provide assistance 
to individuals with psychosocial disabilities so that they can make decisions 
regarding their personal and property affairs, enabling them to remain more 
fully integrated in community life.202 
 
 197. Minkowitz, U.N. Convention, supra note 24, at 409. 
 198. Similar to the PO-Skåne model, Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) is a multi-
disciplinary, community-based mental health service delivery model that provides 
comprehensive and individualized services to meet the medical, rehabilitation, and support 
needs of individuals with “severe and persistent” psychosocial disability.  Treatment and 
Services:  Assertive Community Treatment (ACT), NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, 
http://www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Inform_Yourself/About_Mental_Illness/About_
Treatments_and_Supports/Assertive_Community_Treatment_(ACT)1.htm (last visited June 5, 
2011).  Assertive community treatment programs have been successful in reducing psychiatric 
hospitalization, homelessness, and incarceration.  PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON 
MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 45, at 44, 45 fig. 2.3.  But see, Ronald Diamond, Coercion in the 
Community:  Issues for Mature Treatment Systems, 66 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVICES 3, 16 (1995) (cautioning about the potential for coercion in ACT program). 
 199. Intentional peer support is a consumer-provided program of recovery-oriented, non-
hierarchical psychosocial services and support focusing on mutual exploration of concerns 
between peers.  PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 45, at 37 
(describing the peer support program and citing studies showing its potential to engage 
individuals in traditional mental health services and assist with recovery) (citation omitted).  
See Minkowitz, Discussion on CRPD Article 12, supra note 123, at pts. 3-4 (citing other 
potential models for support, including the Soteria model and Open Dialogues). 
 200. See, e.g., Adult Mental Health Services, NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL 
HYG., http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/dmh/oas.shtml (last visited June 5, 2011).  Intensive 
case management programs may be funded by Medicaid or state Mental Health Services 
budgets and provide regular assistance with a range of personal and financial affairs to 
persons with chronic psychosocial disability.  See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, 
pt. 506, 508 (2010); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.16 (2010). 
 201. A. Frank Johns, Guardianship Folly:  The Misgovernment of Parens Patriae and the 
Forecast of Its Crumbling Linkage to Unprotected Older Americans in the Twenty-First Century 
– A March of Folly? Or Just a Mask of Virtual Reality?, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1, 83 (2007). 
 202. The development of meaningful and effective alternatives for guardianship will require 
commitment and creativity.  See Johns, supra note 201, at 81-86 (discussing some innovative 
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Admittedly, to the extent that this article seeks the creation of wholly new 
legal constructs with substantial requirements and safeguards, the ‘new 
services’ reasoning creates a certain analytical challenge.  However, the 
supported decision-making services sought as an alternative to the 
substituted decision making of guardianship need not be seen as any more 
dramatically different or new than the appropriate, individualized 
community-based care and treatment that courts have required states to 
provide under the integration mandate to enable individuals to move to or 
continue living in the community. To achieve the broad, remedial purpose 
of the ADA, the better analysis would follow the reasoning of Fisher, 
Townsend, and Radaszewski, and conclude that the failure to provide 
decision-making assistance in a less restrictive manner than is provided 
through guardianship presumptively violates the integration mandate.  Thus, 
the state should be required to provide assistance with decision making in 
the most integrated manner appropriate to the needs of individuals with 
psychosocial disabilities, unless doing so would fundamentally alter the state 
program. 
B. Less Restrictive Alternatives To Guardianship Will Not Require A 
Fundamental Program Alteration203 
Under the ADA and Olmstead, the state must provide its programs, 
services, and activities in the least restrictive setting unless doing so would 
require a fundamental program alteration.204  The Olmstead plurality 
opinion sets out a loose standard for the fundamental alteration defense.205  
As a result, there have been some disappointing results in lower court 
decisions, where the court has denied relief, despite the court’s 
determination that the state was not providing services in the least restrictive 
setting as required by the integration mandate.206 
What guidance does Olmstead provide regarding the fundamental 
alteration defense? Olmstead makes clear that cost alone is not 
determinative.207  Therefore, a state will not be ordered to provide 
 
efforts to provide personal and property management services through less restrictive models 
such as protective counseling and community-based support services). 
 203. See Salzman, supra note 1, at 220-31 for a more detailed discussion of this point. 
 204. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2010); Olmstead v. L.C. ex el. 
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 603 (1999).  As noted above,  the “new services” argument has been 
used by Title II defendants as part of their fundamental alteration defense.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 189-196. 
 205. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603-06. 
 206. See Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is Good, You’ll Find Out 
When You Reach the Top, You’re on the Bottom”:  Are the ADA (and Olmstead v. L.C.) 
Anything More Than “Idiot Wind?”, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 255-60 (2002). 
 207. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604. 
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integrated services simply because they are less costly or because the cost of 
the requested integrated care is small in comparison to the relevant portion 
of the state’s budget.208 At the same time, however, a state cannot establish 
a fundamental alteration defense based exclusively on allegations that 
integrated services will increase program costs and place financial pressure 
on the state’s budget.209 
Instead, when determining whether a state should be excused from 
providing a program modification needed to avoid discriminatory disability-
related segregation, a court must consider whether the requested relief 
would so burden the state’s available resources that it would be unable to 
meet the needs of other individuals with similar disabilities or would give 
particular litigants an unfair advantage over other similarly situated 
individuals.210  In a number of cases in which a state has asserted a 
fundamental alteration defense based on the additional cost of providing 
integrated services, courts have required the state to establish that the 
requested relief would interfere with the state’s actual ability to provide 
services to individuals with disabilities.211  Thus, cost alone will not 
determine the success of a fundamental alteration defense in an ADA Title II 
action. 
The Olmstead plurality opinion, however, also concludes that a state 
can meet its fundamental alteration burden by demonstrating that it has “a 
comprehensive, effectively working plan” for placing qualified individuals in 
less restrictive settings, with “a waiting list that move[s] at a reasonable pace 
not controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully 
 
 208. See id. at 603-06; Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 209. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 594–95, 604–05 (1999) (implicitly rejecting the state’s 
assertion that it was already using “all available funds” to provide community-based services 
to other individuals with disabilities).  See also, e.g., Pa. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Pub. Welfare, 402 F.3d 374, 382 (3d Cir. 2005); Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 
383 F.3d 599, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2004).  But see Jennifer Mathis, Where Are We Five Years 
After Olmstead?, 38 J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 561, 568-70 (2005) (critiquing cost analyses 
utilized by several courts). 
 210. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603-04. 
 211. See, e.g., Radaszewski, 383 F.3d at 614; Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 
F.3d 1175, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2003); Townsend, 328 F.3d at 513-15, 519-20; 
Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, No. 01 C 9551, 2008 WL 2097382, *13, *15 
(N.D. Ill. March 26, 2008); Cruz v. Dudek, No. 10-23048-CIV-UNGARO/SIMONTON, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118520, at *40-44 (So. Dist. Fla. Oct. 12, 2010) (finding that, based 
on all the money that the state “receives, allots or spends” on services to persons with spinal 
cord injuries, the state failed to meet its burden of showing that the requested program 
modification would render the state unable to meet the needs of this population).  But see Arc 
of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 619–22 (9th Cir. 2005); Boyd v. Steckel, 
No. 2:10-cv-688-MEF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120802, *37-45 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 12, 2010). 
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populated.”212  In evaluating the adequacy of certain state integration plans, 
courts have rejected some plans that were not sufficiently specific and 
concrete.213  The Olmstead Court’s articulation of the fundamental 
alteration defense, however, reflects the Court’s reluctance to interfere with 
state integration efforts in light of the state’s obligation to care for the entire 
population of individuals with disabilities.  Accordingly, courts have been 
willing to defer to those states that presented a concrete and specific plan 
for on-going integration, finding that the proposed program modifications 
would entail fundamental program alterations.214  The fundamental 
alteration defense generally presents the most significant obstacle in 
integration mandate litigation, both because of the generous legal standard 
set out by the Court and the complexity of the proof that may be necessary 
to defeat the defense.215 
Plaintiffs seeking modification of guardianship and the provision of 
supported decision-making options should be prepared to show that the 
requested modifications would not fundamentally alter the state’s program 
for providing assistance with decision making to all individuals with 
limitations in decision-making abilities.216  States may legitimately argue that 
the program modifications sought in this article actually constitute a wholly 
new program for assisting individuals with decision-making limitations with 
the management of their personal and financial affairs.  But, it is not clear 
that any state currently has a specific, comprehensive, and effectively 
working plan for providing services to assist individuals needing assistance 
with decision making through less restrictive means than guardianship.  
States should not be permitted to argue that the provision of less restrictive 
services would necessitate a fundamental alteration of the guardianship 
program because the state would have to change the segregated way in 
which it now provides assistance with decision making.217 
 
 212. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-06.  See also Arc of Wash. State Inc., 427 F.3d at 621-
22. 
 213. See Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 422 F.3d 151, 155, 158, 160 (3d 
Cir. 2005); Pa. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 402 F.3d 374, 383-85 
(3d Cir. 2005); Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 302-05 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009); Cruz, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118520 at *41-43. 
 214. See, e.g., Arc of Wash. State Inc., 427 F.3d at 621–22; Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 
F.3d 1051, 1063-67 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 215. See, e.g., Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 2003); 653 F. Supp. 
2d at 267-300. 
 216. See Olmstead L.C. v. ex el. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999); Salzman, supra note 
1, at 228-30 (discussing some comparative costs between guardianship and supported 
decision-making options, and observing that some costs of the guardianship system could 
simply be transferred to fund supported decision-making options). 
 217. See Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 611, 614 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
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CONCLUSION 
By creating a presumption of capacity and participation, supported 
decision-making models acknowledge and respect the inherent human 
value of persons with psychosocial disabilities.  The support paradigm shifts 
the focus from a perceived deficiency in the individual (“incapacity”) to the 
social responsibility to provide assistance with decision making.  By 
respecting the individual’s right and ability to make decisions, supported 
decision making significantly limits the stigmatization and marginalization 
caused by guardianship, and more fully integrates individuals with 
psychosocial disabilities into social, political and economic life. 
No one pretends that supported decision making is any more of a 
science than guardianship or other types of surrogate decision making.  
Many of the challenges presented by supported decision making are not 
new, and have been considered and debated in the context of guardianship 
reform.  But they are challenges that involve serious questions of human 
value and self-determination.  The importance of these challenges compels 
us to look beyond the guardianship construct for answers.  Re-
conceptualizing guardianship as one lingering mechanism of disability-
based exclusion prohibited by the ADA’s integration mandate, forces us to 
think differently about the obligation to remove unnecessary barriers to 
integration and to facilitate the full participation of individuals with 
psychosocial disabilities in all of life’s activities. 
The question of “whether it is realistic to put such a [supported decision 
making] system into place will be measured through different practices of 
States Parties which need to aim constantly to perform better within their 
available resources.”218  In the movement toward reform, it will be useful to 
demonstrate that supported decision-making options are able to successfully 
meet individual needs in a manner that is less restrictive than guardianship, 
that they are more beneficial to the individual’s well-being than assigning a 
guardian, and that they do not entail significantly greater financial resources 
than the guardianship option.  Existing supported decision-making models 
should be studied to identify those best practices that: 1) maximize the 
individual’s responsibility for and involvement in decisions affecting his or 
her life; 2) ensure that the individual’s wishes and preferences are respected; 
3) ensure legal recognition of decisions made with support or by the 
individual’s appointed agent; 4) provide the most appropriate qualifications 
and training for support persons, and standards for carrying out support 
responsibilities; 5) create the most efficient and effective mechanisms for 
funding support programs (including the possibility of volunteer support 
services); 6) have the most effective mechanisms for oversight and 
 
 218. Kämpf, supra note 27, at 31. 
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monitoring to ensure that the support relationship does not result in harm to 
the individual and protects against conflicts of interest, undue influence, or 
coercion of the individual needing support; 7) create standards for 
appointment of a substitute decision-maker that ensure that an individual is 
divested of decision-making rights only to the extent and for the time period 
that is absolutely necessary.  There may be costs attached to the expansion 
and development of appropriate supported decision-making options, but 
the benefit in human terms may justify them, and the language and spirit of 
the ADA and the principles enunciated in the CRPD demand their adoption. 
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